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ABSTRACT 
The law of China and Vietnam has been often ignored or 
marginalized in mainstream scholarship of comparative law. This is 
due to three orientalist assumptions, namely: nihilism (lawlessness); 
instrumentalism (law as a tool for political control without rule of law 
qualities); and assimilationism (no distinctive legal systems). These 
assumptions fail to capture the complexity of law in China and Vietnam 
and fail to place it in a better positon in comparative law. This Article 
argues that the exploration of the law of China and Vietnam can 
substantively enrich comparative law scholarship, for the following 
reasons: first, there are multiple layers of law throughout their legal 
history, namely chthonic law, Confucian law, civil law, socialist law, 
and global law; second, the two states have accommodated some forms 
of the rule of law as a strategic response to the need to consolidate the 
legitimacy of the socialist regimes; and third, there are distinctive legal 
systems in these countries, namely the Confucian legal system and the 
socialist legal system, which are separate from other traditional legal 
systems (Islamic law, Hindu law, and Buddhist law) and other modern 
legal systems (civil law and common law). This Article concludes that 
the study of law in China and Vietnam can make important 
contributions to: traditional comparative law (functionalism and 
taxonomy of legal systems); post-modern comparative law (law and 
ideology, law and politics, law and culture, law and society, and legal 
pluralism); and global comparative law (legal transplants, global legal 
diffusion, and law and development). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article aims to locate the law of China and Vietnam within 
the general context of comparative law.1 A background introduction is 
necessary. China and Vietnam are two Asian countries whose 
populations (about 1.4 billion and 95 million respectively) make up 
                                                                                                                         
1. Its primary concern is not to compare law in China and Vietnam, although some 
comparisons are occasionally made. For substantive comparison, see LEGAL REFORMS IN CHINA 
AND VIETNAM:  A COMPARISON OF ASIAN COMMUNIST REGIMES (John Gillespie & Albert H.Y. 
Chen eds., 2010); ASIAN SOCIALISM AND LEGAL CHANGE: THE DYNAMICS OF VIETNAMESE 
AND CHINESE REFORM (John Gillespie and Pip Nicholson, eds. 2005). 
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approximately twenty percent of the world population.2 During their 
millennia history, both countries were influenced by Confucianism, one 
of the world’s major traditions of philosophy.3 The two countries are 
among the five socialist/communist countries4 that survived the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.5 After the Cold War, both countries have 
implemented the so-called “socialist market economy”, leading to 
China’s being second largest economy and Vietnam’s being the 47th-
largest economy in the world measured by nominal gross domestic 
product.6 Both China and Vietnam have actively integrated in the 
global economy, including the joining of the World Trade 
Organization.7 Accompanying economic reform is legal reform. The 
two socialist countries have implemented the so-called “socialist rule 
of law state,”8 leading to the development of sophisticated legal 
systems, despite the international condemnations of violation of human 
rights and the lacking of the rule of law.9 
                                                                                                                         
2. Countries in the world by population (2017), WORLDOMETERS, http://www. 
worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country [https://perma.cc/DN5R-KWJU] 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2017). 
3. See generally, RETHINKING CONFUCIANISM: PAST AND PRESENT IN CHINA, JAPAN, 
KOREA AND VIETNAM (Benjamin A. Elman, et al. eds., 2002). 
4. International observers tend to describe these countries as “communist.” See eg., LEGAL 
REFORMS IN CHINA AND VIETNAM, supra note 1. Meanwhile, these countries tend to identify 
themselves as “socialist.”  See for Vietnam Constitution, art. 2(1) (2013) (“The Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam State is a social rule of law State . . . ”); XIANFA art. 1 (1982) (China) 
(“The People’s Republic of China is a socialist state.”). In this Article, “communist” or 
“socialist” regime is understood with same meaning to refer to the regime ruled by a communist 
party. 
5. The three others are Cuba, Laos, and North Korea. For the survival of the communist 
regimes, see WHY COMMUNISM DID NOT COLLAPSE: UNDERSTANDING AUTHORITARIAN 
REGIME RESILIENCE IN ASIA AND EUROPE (Martin K. Dimitrov ed. 2013). 
6. For economic reform in China and Vietnam, see TRANSFORMING ASIAN SOCIALISM:  
CHINA AND VIETNAM COMPARED (Anita Chan, Benedict J. Tria Kwekvliet, & Jonathan Unger, 
eds. 1999); MARKET AND SOCIALISM:  IN THE LIGHT OF THE EXPERIENCES OF CHINA AND 
VIETNAM (Janos Kornai & Yingyi Qian eds., 2008). 
7. Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e
/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm] (last visited Oct. 4, 2017). 
8. For China, see the roundtable on the future of China’s “rule according to law,” ASIAN 
POLICY 20 (July 2015). For Vietnam, see John Gillespie, Changing Concepts of Socialist Law 
in Vietnam, in ASIAN SOCIALISM AND LEGAL CHANGE:  THE DYNAMICS OF VIETNAMESE AND 
CHINESE REFORM 45 (John Gillespie and Pip Nicholson eds., 2005). 
9. See e.g., China: Events of 2016, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2017/country-chapters/china-and-tibet [https://perma.cc/5PK2-6A2X] (last visited Oct. 
29, 2017); Vietnam: Events of 2016, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2017/country-chapters/vietnam [https://perma.cc/W3B8-JV7X] (last visited Oct. 29, 
2017).  
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Unfortunately, law in China and Vietnam has been ignored or 
marginalized in mainstream scholarship of comparative law,10 although 
it has been extensively studied by county-experts and scholars of 
comparative Asian legal studies.11 Comparative law literature has 
focused mainly on modern legal systems of western developed 
countries in North America and Europe.12 When it comes to Asia, 
comparative law scholars are more concerned with the countries which 
have similar institutional settings and level of development, such as 
Japan.13 The neglect or marginalization of Chinese and Vietnamese law 
in comparative law stems from, among other things, what is called 
“legal orientalism”14 or the western conceptualization of law in the 
Oriental societies like China and Vietnam. Legal orientalism has 
generated at least three assumptions about law in China and Vietnam, 
which can be called: nihilism, instrumentalism, and assimilationism. 
The nihilist view is that such oriental societies like China (and by 
extent Vietnam) were dominated by “oriental despotism”15 in which 
law did not exist as the consequence of “the rule of man”.16 Even in 
modern time, it has been also argued that the domination of the 
communist regimes in these countries has resulted in the neglect of law, 
                                                                                                                         
10. See e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, PAOLO G. CAROZZA & COLIN B. PICKER, 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS:  TEXT, MATERIALS, AND CASES ON WESTERN LAW, 
FOURTH EDITION (2014); RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW:  CASES, 
TEXTS, MATERIALS (1998). The law in China is sometime referred to in major comparative law 
work. See e.g., PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 319-360 (2014); UGO 
MATTEI, TEEMU RUSKOLA & ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, 
TEXT, MATERIALS (7th ed. 2009). 
11. See e.g. Gillespie & Chen, eds., supra note 1.  
12. MATHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW 35-37 (2014) (criticizing “the focus on western 
countries” in comparative legal studies”). 
13. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2006), including one chapter on “development of comparative law in East 
Asia”, which focuses on Japan). See also, JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, DAVID S. CLARK & JOHN 
OWEN HALEY, COMPARATIVE LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION IN EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA (2010) (including one chapter on law 
of East Asian countries, namely China, Korea, Japan, and Thailand). 
14. For legal orientalism, see TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM:  CHINA, THE 
UNITED STATES AND MODERN LAW (2013); Carol G.S. Tan, On Law and Orientalism, 7 J. 
COMP. L. 5 (2012). 
15. See generally, KARL AUGUST WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM:  A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF TOTAL POWER (1957). 
16. Teemu Ruskola, Law Without Law, or Is “Chinese Law” an Oxymoron?, 11 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 655, 656 (2003). 
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such the time of lawlessness during Mao era in China.17 If the subject 
matter does not exist, there would be no study. Second, some may agree 
that there are laws in modern China and Vietnam but hold the 
instrumentalist view that the socialist states have promulgated law as a 
tool for political control, exemplified what is called the rule by law 
rather than the rule of law.18 When law in China and Vietnam is 
considered lacking the rule of law qualities, it will be marginalized or 
ignored in comparative law literature. Finally, assimilationists cannot 
see distinctive legal systems in China and Vietnam separate from the 
two dominant legal systems, namely civil law and common law. 19 
Therefore, they have ignored or marginalized their law and focused on 
the dominant civil law and common law.  
The three above assumptions fail to capture the complexity of law 
in China and Vietnam and fail to place it in a better positon in 
comparative law. This Article argues that the exploration of the law of 
China and Vietnam can substantively enrich comparative law 
scholarship, for the following reasons: first, there are multiple layers of 
law throughout their legal history, namely chthonic law, Confucian 
law, civil law, socialist law, and global law; second, the two states have 
accommodated some forms of the rule of law as a strategic response to 
the need to consolidate the legitimacy of the socialist regimes; and 
third, there are distinctive legal systems in these countries, namely the 
Confucian legal system and the socialist legal system, which are 
separate from other traditional legal systems (Islamic law, Hindu law, 
and Buddhist law) and other modern legal systems (civil law and 
common law). This Article concludes that the study of law in China 
and Vietnam can make important contributions to: traditional 
comparative law (functionalism and taxonomy of legal systems); post-
modern comparative law (law and ideology, law and politics, law and 
culture, law and society, and legal pluralism); and global comparative 
                                                                                                                         
17. Mo Zhang, The Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics: China’s 
Discourse for the Rule of Law and a Bitter Experience, 24 TEMP. INT’L & COMP.1, 12 (2010) 
(“many regarded Mao’s era as the era of “lawlessness.’”). 
18. Eric Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 43, 106 (2001) 
(“The Chinese government seems to move strongly toward adopting the rule by law in the 
instrumental, positive sense…”). 
19.  See e.g., the conflation of socialist law and civil law, John Quigley, Socialist Law and 
the Civil Law Tradition, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 781, 808 (1989) (“Socialist law contains features 
that distinguish it from the legal systems of other countries of the civil law family. But those 
points of difference have not removed socialist law from the civil law tradition”).  
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law (legal transplants, global legal diffusion, and law and 
development). 
This argument is pursued in four parts. Part I explores the multiple 
layers of law in China and Vietnam. Part II will examine the partial 
achievement of the rule of law in the two countries. Part III considers 
the two distinctive legal systems. Part IV concludes with further 
reflections on the possible contributions of exploration of law in China 
and Vietnam to comparative law. 
II. NIHILISM? MULTIPLE LAYERS OF LAW. 
Different laws have existed throughout Chinese and Vietnamese 
legal history, including: chthonic law, Confucian law, civil law, 
socialist law, and global law. Currently although China and Vietnam 
are socialist countries, their law does not exclusively include socialist 
law as elements of other laws have still informed the complex situation 
of legality. I propose the concept of “multiplayers of law” to understand 
this complexity. This concept refers to the co-existence of different 
legal ideas, rules, process, institutions, and cultures in one society. 
Within this multiple legal framework, one legal system may be 
dominant, but elements of other legal layers still exist in their complex 
interactions. 
A. Chthonic Law 
Patrick Glenn usefully coins the term “chthonic law” to refer to 
the law of indigenous people.20 This oldest forms of law exist in both 
China and Vietnam. In China’s Shang dynasty (c. 1600 BC–c. 
1046 BC), chthonic law embodies in the customary laws of the zu, “a 
consanguineous group of people descended from a common 
ancestor.”21 In his book Origins of Chinese Law, Yongping Liu argues 
that “there were no unified customary law in Shang times, but there are 
many sets of customary laws practiced by the different zu.”22 The 
subsequent dynasty, the Zhou dynasty, codified a series of li (rituals) 
in an attempt to “maintain the unity of the members of the Zhou Zu”, 
but still “allowed the people of other zu to use their customary laws.”23 
                                                                                                                         
20. GLENN, supra note 10, at 60. 
21. YONGPING LIU, ORIGINS OF CHINESE LAW 21 (1998). 
22. Id. at 22. 
23. Id. 
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That means the Zhou’s law includes both the codified li and the 
indigenous law. 
Prior to the coming of the Chinese conquers in 111 BC, the 
Vietnamese people lived according to their indigenous law. Ma Yuan, 
a Chinese official, reported to the Han Emperor that “the law of the 
Viet people” was different from the law of the Han dynasty in ten 
points.24 There is no evidence indicating the existing of written law 
prior to the Chinese domination. What Ma Yuan called “the law of the 
Viet people” is indigenous law orally transmitted and memorized 
throughout different generations of the Vietnamese people. One 
example from the marriage law is the customary rule that when the 
older brother dies, the younger brother will marry his sister-in-law, 
which is stemmed from the matrilineal system of the indigenous 
people.25 Chthonic law continues to exist throughout Vietnamese legal 
evolution with different nuances and contents. During the Chinese 
dependency period (111 BC- AD 905), the Chinese conquers continued 
to allow the local people to live according to their indigenous law at the 
village level. Successive independent dynasties in Vietnam also 
allowed the existence of chthonic law at communal level. Notably, 
during the independent period, chthonic law was written down. The 
hương ước (village law) drafted around the 15th century is a written 
mixture of Confucian moral norms and indigenous customs of the 
villages.26 Under French colonialism (1887-1945), hương ước 
continued to exist as the mixture of indigenous customs and colonial 
policies for villages. The Communist government abolished the hương 
ước but has allowed their revivals since 1998. Contemporary hương 
ước are a mixture of indigenous customs and socialist policies for 
communal communities.27 While the Kinh people, the Vietnamese 
majority residing in North Vietnam have their hương ước, minority 
groups in Western Highlands and Northwest of Vietnam have their own 
                                                                                                                         
24. PHAN HUY LÊ, ET AL., LỊCH SỬ VIỆT NAM, TẬP 1 [VIETNAMESE HISTORY, VOLUME 
1] 217 (1991). 
25. VŨ VĂN MẪU, CỔ LUẬT VIỆT NAM VÀ TƯ PHÁP SỬ DIỄN GIẢNG, QUYỀN THỨ NHẤT, 
TẬP MỘT [VIETNAMESE TRADITIONAL LAW AND THE EXPLANATION OF PRIVATE LAW, BOOK 
I, VOLUME 1] 129-132 (1975). 
26. See generally, VŨ DUY MỀN, HƯƠNG ƯỚC CỔ ĐỒNG BẰNG BẮC BỘ [ANCIENT 
VILLAGE CONTRACTS IN NORTH VIETNAM] (2010). 
27. ĐÀO TRÍ ÚC ED., HƯƠNG ƯỚC TRONG QUÁ TRÌNH THỰC HIỆN DÂN CHỦ Ở NƯỚC TA 
HIỆN NAY [COMMUNAL CONTRACTS IN THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING DEMOCRACY IN OUR 
NATION TODAY] (2003). 
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indigenous law with different names, such as Hịt khỏng (Thái), Phat 
kđi (Êđê), Phat Ktuôi (M’nông), N’ri (Mạ).28 
The Civil Code in Vietnam recognizes the applications of 
customary law defined as “rules of conduct obvious to define rights and 
obligations of persons in specific civil relations, forming and repeating 
in a long time, recognized and applying generally in a region, race, or 
a community or a field of civil.”29 That means indigenous law is a layer 
in the Vietnamese multi-player legal system. 
B. Confucian Law 
I use the term “Confucian law” to refer to a distinctive legal 
system that is drawn on fundamental ideas, concepts, and principles of 
Confucianism. Confucianism is a Chinese school of thought created by 
Confucius (551-479 BC) and developed by Mencius (372 – 289 BC) 
and Xunzi (312–230 BC) during the late Spring and Autumn Period 
(770-476 BC) and Warring States Period (475-221 BC) in the history 
of China.30 Major Confucian work includes: The Four Books (The 
Analects of Confucius, The Mencius, The Great Learning, and The 
Doctrine of the Mean); Five Classics (the I Ching or Book of Changes, 
the Shu Ching or Book of History, the Shih Ching or Book of Poetry), 
the Yi Li or Book of Rites, and the Chunqiu or Spring and Autumn 
Annals); and Xunzi’s writings.31 Confucianism is a tradition and a 
philosophy about a good way of life, including a good way of 
governing. Particularly, in response to the historical context of political 
chaos, classical Confucians’ central concern is a good political order 
which in their belief depends on personal cultivation of virtual values. 
Confucian philosophy therefore develops different moral, political, and 
legal ideas, concepts, and principles. 
                                                                                                                         
28. See generally, NGÔ ĐỨC THỊNH, LUẬT TỤC TRONG ĐỜI SỐNG CÁC TỘC NGƯỜI Ở 
VIỆT NAM [CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE LIVES OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN VIETNAM] (2010). See also, 
David Lempert, Ethnic Communities and Legal Pluralism: The Politics of Legal Argument in 
Market-Oriented Communist Vietnam, 25 LEGAL STUD. F. 539 (2001). 
29. Civil Code, No. 91/2015/QH13, art. 5 (Nov. 24, 2015) (Viet.). 
30. See generally, XINZHONG YAO, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONFUCIANISM (2000). 
31.  THE FOUR BOOKS: CONFUCIAN ANALECTS, THE GREAT LEARNING, THE DOCTRINE 
OF THE MEAN, AND THE WORKS OF MENCIUS (James Legge, trans., 1945); MICHAEL NYLAN, 
THE FIVE “CONFUCIAN” CLASSICS (2001); JOHN KNOBLOCK, TRANS. XUNZI: A TRANSLATION 
AND STUDY OF THE COMPLETE WORKS (1988, 1990, 1994). 
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In Confucianism, ren (variously translated into English as “love”, 
“perfect virtue”, benevolence”, or “humaneness32) is the central 
concept foundational to the rest moral, political, and legal discourses. 
The term is not clearly defined in Confucian work, which leads to 
different scholarly explanations.33 I define ren as the love of others or 
the concern for others, the distinctive characteristic of the socialized 
human, distinguishing human being from other beings.34 On the ground 
of the central concept of ren, Confucianism develops different moral 
norms regarding the concerns for others in different social 
relationships, such as xiao (filial piety), ti (fraternal submission), and 
zhong (loyalty). 
Ren is also the foundation for the governmental and legal 
concepts: zheng ming (rectification of names) or the consistence 
between the governmental tittles and the expected virtues and 
functions; minben (people as basis) or the government working for the 
public good; and li which comprehensively includes “rituals, 
institutions, social and moral norms, which regulate all dimensions of 
the peoples’ lives, ranging from personal behavior, familial 
relationships, to socio-political functions and structures.”35 
Particularly, li is an important concept in Confucian legal theory.36 Ren 
is the moral foundation of li. Therefore, “in order to comply with Li, it 
was essential to possess morals such as filial submission, brotherliness, 
righteousness, good faith, and loyalty, basic norms of of virtue.”37 
From the Han dynasty (221 B.C.) to the fall of the Qing dynasty 
(1911), the legal system in China was predominantly influenced by 
Confucianism, and hence it can be called Confucian law, although it 
was also influenced by Legalism, another Chinese school of thought 
which underlines the use of law (particularly criminal law) as the 
instrument of state control.38 The Confucian influence leads to the 
characterization of “Confucianization of law” or “the incorporation of 
                                                                                                                         
32. In this study, I refer to use the English term “humaneness”, which better captures the 
meaning of ren. 
33. See FUNG YU-LAN, A HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY VOL. 1 70 (Derk Bodde 
trans. 1952); TU WEI-MING, THE CREATIVE TENSION BETWEEN JEN AND LI, 18 PHILOSOPHY E. 
W. 34 (1968). 
34. BUI NGOC SON, CONFUCIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EAST ASIA 35 (2016). 
35. Id. at 52. 
36. DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 51 (1973). 
37. Zhang, supra note 17, at 12. 
38. For legalism, see Eirik Lang Harris, Legalism: Introducing a Concept and Analyzing 
Aspects of Han Fei’s Political Philosophy, 9 PHILOSOPHY COMPASS 155 (2014). 
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the spirit and sometimes of the actual provisions of the Confucian li 
into the legal codes.”39 One of the most important legal codes in 
imperial China is the Tang Code, which “laid a foundation of the 
traditional Chinese legal system.”40 According to Mo Zhang, “many in 
China regarded the whole Tang Code as an outward legal expression 
of the Li not only because it was deeply rooted in the Li, but also 
because it legalized the Li as the basic social norms of conduct.”41 
Particularly, “the ten abominations”, the most serious offenses, 
stipulated in the Code, “express what we have termed fundamental 
Confucian morality.”42 For example, one of them is the lacking of filial 
piety, which aims to protect the Confucian moral norm of xiao (filial 
piety). Confucianism influenced on not only formal criminal codes but 
also the practice of criminal law and criminal procedure. Norman P. Ho 
demonstrates that officials of the Tang dynasty drew on not only the 
Tang Code but also fundamental moral principles in Confucian 
classical texts to decide cases.43 In addition to criminal law and 
procedure, “constitutional law” and administrative law in imperial 
China were also influenced by Confucianism.44 The creation of several 
imperial institutions (such as the royal examination system, jingyan or 
imperial lectures, and yushitai or censorate) was inspired by Confucian 
principles of good government operated by well-educated and virtual 
scholars.45 
The Confucian legal culture has still influenced in contemporary 
China. Mo Zhang indicates that the Confucian position of a benevolent 
government working for the people “maintain its influence in the 
country. For example, it is a commonly held belief in China that a good 
                                                                                                                         
39. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 36, at 29. Some refers to the “legalization of 
Confucianism.” See Herbert H. P. Ma, The Legalization of Confucianism and its Impact on 
Family Relationships, 65 WASH. U. L. Q. 667 (1987). 
40. Zhang, supra note 17, at 10. 
41. Id. at 13. 
42. GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE LAW 57 (1996). 
43. Norman P. Ho, Understanding Traditional Chinese Law in Practice: The 
Implementation of Criminal Law in the Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD), 32 UCLA PACIFIC BASIN 
L. J., 145, 163 (2015); Norman P. Ho, Confucian Jurisprudence in Practice: Pre-Tang Dynasty 
Panwen (Written Legal Judgments), 22 PACIFIC RIM L. & POL. J. 49 (2013); Norman P. Ho, 
Confucian Jurisprudence, Dworkin, and Hard Cases, 10 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. (forthcoming 
2017). 
44. Wm. Theodore de Bary, The ‘Constitutional Tradition’ in China 9 (7) J. CHINESE L. 
7-8 (1995); Pierre-Étienne Will, Virtual Constitutionalism in the Late Ming Dynasty in 
BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 261-274 (Stéphanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle 
eds., 2009). 
45. See generally, FRANKLIN W. HOUN, CHINESE POLITICAL TRADITIONS (1965). 
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government is the source of a better life for the people, and the 
traditional concept of a “parental officer,” whose job is to make 
decisions for the people, remains intact in the minds of the public and 
the government.”46 Another example is that the Confucian virtue of 
filial piety becomes a legal duty in today’s China: the revised law called 
“Protection of the Rights and Interests of Elderly People” requires adult 
children to visit their aging parents regularly.47 The first case was heard 
by the People’s Court of Beitang District, Wuxi City in east China’s 
Jiangsu Province.48 “The court ruled in favor of the 77-year-old 
plaintiff, surnamed Chu, who sued her daughter for neglecting her.”49 
Citing the above law, the court ordered that Chu’s daughter and son-
in-law must visit Chu every two months and “at least three times during 
major traditional holidays.”50 
Confucian law was transplanted from China into Vietnam. During 
the Chinese dependency period, the colonists introduced Confucianism 
and Confucian law, but the local people largely lived under their 
indigenous law, which was tolerated by the invaders. Early 
independent dynasties, such as the Tran and the Ly dynasties, have 
some policies to develop Confucianism and Confucian law, but it was 
not until 15th century under the rule of the Le Dynasty that 
Confucianism became official ideology of the imperial government and 
Confucian law was well developed with the enactment of the Quốc 
triều Hình luật (the Penal Code of the Royal Court), informally called 
Luật Hồng Đức (Hồng Đức Code).51 Despite its name, the code covers 
different areas from criminal law to civil law. The Tang Code of China 
was the model of the Hồng Đức Code. Yet, the Le Code is the 
consequence of both legal transplants and indigenization. The Le Code 
was more influenced by the Tang Code on criminal matters, but on civil 
law issues (such as contracts, torts, property, inheritance, and 
matrimonial property), it was more reflective of Vietnamese 
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indigenous customs and social reality.52 Different from the Le dynasty, 
the Nguyen dynasty (1802-1945), the last dynasty in Vietnam, enacted 
the Hoàng Việt Luật Lệ or the Gia Long Code in 1815, loyally 
mirroring China’s Qing Code. This code was also enforced during the 
French colonial period.53 In addition to legal codes, the imperial 
government in Vietnam also created several institutions inspired by 
Confucianism, such as royal examination system, jingyan or imperial 
lectures, and yushitai or censorate.54 
The legal system in imperial Vietnam is comprised of not only the 
above comprehensive legal codes but also many other more specific 
legal codes and imperial regulations, including: 
 Thiên Nam Dư Hạ Tập (1483) (Volume of the Leisure of 
the Southern Heaven), a collection of imperial 
regulations on different specific issues; 
 Hồng Đức Thiện Chính Thư (1541-1560?) (Hồng Đức’s 
Book on Good Governance), a collection of imperial 
regulations on civil law issues, mainly property and 
family law; 
 Quốc Triều Chiếu Lệnh Thiện Chính (1705-1729) (The 
Dynasty’s Promulgations and Orders on Good 
Governance), a collection of imperial proclamations and 
orders on different specific issues; 
 Quốc Triều Khám Tụng Điều Lệnh ((1705-1729) (The 
Dynasty’s Promulgations on Litigation), a collection of 
imperial promulgations on civil and criminal procedures; 
 Lê Triều Hội Điển (unknown date) (The Lê Dynasty’s 
United Regulations), a book on the administrations of six 
ministries (revenue, personnel, defense, justice, public 
works, and rites); 
 Từ tụng Điều Lệ (1468) (Regulations on Litigation), a 
collection of imperial regulations on civil and criminal 
procedures; 
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 Nhân mạng Tra nghiệm Pháp (1737) (Methods of 
Forensic Autopsy), a collection official instructions on 
forensic autopsy; and 
 Quốc Triều Hồng Đức Niên Gian Chư Cung Thể Thức 
(1470-1497) (Hồng Đức Dynasty’s Formats For 
Pleadings), a collection of official formats for drafting 
legal documents filed with a mandarin’s office.55 
Unlike the comprehensive criminal codes, these legal texts focus 
on civil law, administrative law, civil and criminal procedure, criminal 
examination, and legal process, although they may also include 
criminal penalties. They include not only legally enforceable norms but 
also prescriptions of moral conducts and other instructions. Like the 
above criminal codes, these legal texts are also influenced by 
Confucian moral principles. An extensive examination of these legal 
texts is beyond the scope of this study. It is, however, useful to give 
some examples. The Hong Duc Book on Good Governance, the unique 
book on civil law in imperial Vietnam, comprised many provisions 
about familial issues, which are influenced by Confucianism. For 
example, Article 36 in an imperial regulation collected in the Book 
stipulates that: “To be a man, to teach and bring up virtuous father and 
filial children are the foremost tasks. Parents must provide their 
children with rice and clothes…Children must respect and support their 
parents…”56 This Article tries to protect the Confucian norm of filial 
piety. In the same regulation, Article 38 listed seven reasons for the 
husband to divorce his wife: failing to have children; disregarding the 
husband for his poverty; malignant disease; lasciviousness; failing to 
respect parents; failing to live in harmony with sisters and brothers; and 
stealing.57 This provision is closely connected to three among the sìzì 
or four virtues in Confucianism, namely zhong (loyalty to the king), 
xiao (filial piety), jie (faithfulness), and yi (righteousness).58 
Vestiges of Confucian law still remain even under the 
contemporary communist rule in Vietnam. To illustrate, the first 
sentence of the preamble to the Constitution restates the tradition of 
                                                                                                                         
55. These texts are published in modern Vietnamese language. See VIỆN NGHIÊN CỨU 
HÁN NÔM, ĐIỂN CHẾ VÀ PHÁP LUẬT VIỆT NAM THỜI TRUNG ĐẠI [INSTITUTIONS AND LAWS 
IN VIETNAM IN THE MEDIEVAL ERA] (2011). 
56. VIỆN NGHIÊN CỨU HÁN NÔM, 1 ĐIỂN CHẾ VÀ PHÁP LUẬT VIỆT NAM THỜI TRUNG 
ĐẠI, [INSTITUTIONS AND LAWS IN VIETNAM IN THE MIDDLE PERIOD] 456 (2011). 
57. Id. 
58. For more details on these Confucian virtues, see CHUN SHAN, Major Aspects of 
Chinese Religion and Philosophy: Dao of Inner Saint and Outer King 223 (2012). 
148 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:135 
nhân nghĩa (humaneness-righteousness).59 In addition, as a 
constitutional culture, the Vietnamese communist leaders have been 
influenced by both socialist values and Confucian beliefs “that value 
virtue-rule more highly than strict conformity to legal rules and 
processes.”60 The Criminal Code also protects some moral values 
resonated with the Confucian ethics. For example, the Code includes 
the offence called “Ill-treating or persecuting grand-parents, parents, 
spouses, children, grandchildren and/or fosterers.”61 This provision 
echoes the Confucian norm of filial piety. Another example in the Code 
is Article 19 on “non-denunciation of crimes.” This Article stipulates 
that the grand-father, grand-mother, father, mother, offspring, 
grandchild, sibling, wife or husband of an offender, who fails to 
denounce the latter’s crime, shall not bear penal liability unless in cases 
of failing to denounce crimes against national security or particularly 
serious crimes.62 This reminds another controversial aspect called zhi 
(uprightness) in the Confucian norm of filial piety, which requires 
upright son to “remonstrate his father against his wrongdoing, and the 
best environment for the successful remonstration can be provided by 
non-disclosure of his father’s wrongdoing.”63 
Confucian influence is particularly evident in Vietnam’s family 
law.64 Especially, the Confucian norm of filial piety remains a strong 
influence. 65 To illustrate, the Law on Family and Marriage provides 
that: “Children have the obligations and rights to care for and support 
their parents, especially when their parents fall sick, become senile or 
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disabled.”66 The Law also requires that: “Adult children who no longer 
live with their parents are obliged to support their parents who have no 
working capacity and no property to support themselves.”67 In addition, 
the Law stipulates that the following agencies and organizations have 
the right, as prescribed by the civil procedures legislation, to request 
the Court to force the people who fail to voluntarily perform their 
supporting obligation to perform such obligation: relatives, 
administrative bodies on family and children, women’s unions, and 
“other individuals, agencies and organizations.”68 Also, the Law on the 
Elderly People underlines the children’s duty to offer financial support 
to their parents and grandparents.69 Mass media has disseminated many 
facts about the elderly parents being neglected by their children,70 but 
there is no any case in which parents sue their children for being 
neglected. This context of non-litigation may connect to moral 
considerations. 
Several important factors shape the continuing influence of 
Confucian legal culture in Vietnam. One factor concerns Ho Chi Minh, 
the father of modern Vietnam and the founder of the Communist Party 
of Vietnam, who has played the influential role even in today’s 
Vietnam. Different from Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh is an advocate of 
Confucian moral values and principles.71 Second, modern Vietnam 
does not witness radical movements against Confucianism, like 
China’s May Four Movement and Cultural Revolution Movement. 
These factors enable the continuing influence of Confucian legal 
culture in contemporary Vietnam. However, the recent rising anti-
Chinese nationalist movement72 in Vietnam as the consequence of the 
conflict between China and Vietnam over the islands may inhibit the 
direct reference to Confucian values in legal discourse and practice. In 
this context, the influence of Confucian legal culture may happen at 
unconscious level: people may not be aware of the Confucian origins 
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of certain norms and values that inform their legal behavior and 
practice. 
C. Civil Law 
Entering the twentieth century, both China and Vietnam 
transplanted ideas, norms, and institutions of the civil law tradition 
from the western world as a response to the need to modernize the legal 
system and the nation more generally so as to cope up with the 
challenges posted by the western powers. 
In his recent book, Michael H.K. Ng provides an extensive 
account of the “Legal Transplantation in Early Twentieth-century 
China.”73 Accordingly, in early 1900s, the Qing government initiated a 
series of legal reforms.74 After the first Opium War (1839–42), China 
was forced to sign treaties with Western industrial nations, which led 
to the extraterritorial application of their western law and institutions 
in the Chinese territory.75 Ng notes that “in an attempt to secure the 
Western powers’ support to abolish extraterritoriality” most of the 
proposals for legal reform were based on the western civil law model 
and the Japanese model which had been in turn westernized.76 In the 
course of legal reforms based on legal transplants, the Qing government 
sent their legal experts to study law overseas (mainly in Europe) and 
hired foreign legal experts (mainly from Japan) as consultants for its 
legal reforms initiatives.77 Consequently, the Qing government enacted 
many legal codes, which “were drafted largely on the base of German, 
French, and Japanese templates.”78 Examples include the Provisional 
Articles for Local Courts and the Court Organization Law, which 
introduced important changes to the justice system, such as the 
distinction of civil and criminal cases in trial procedures, or the 
confirmation of courts as “separate[d] and specialized institution[s] for 
hearing and adjudicating lawsuits.”79 
The Qing dynasty also drafted the Civil Code, modelling after 
German and Japanese law, but this law was not completed under the 
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imperial regime.80 The Xinhai Revolution in 1911 overturned the Qing 
dynasty and created the Republic of China. The republican government 
resumed the law-making process, but the Code was also not enacted 
due to “power struggles amongst warlords.”81 Eventually, the Civil 
Code was enacted in 1930 under the Nationalist Government, drawn 
mainly on the civil law tradition.82 As Mo Zhang explains, “In addition 
to its civil law style of division between general principles and specific 
provisions, the Code was replete with civil law concepts. For example, 
Part III of the Code dealt with property rights, but it used the name of 
‘Rights over Things.’ ‘Things’ is a term for property in civil law 
countries.”83 Apart from the Civil Code, the Nationalist Government 
also enacted five other major codes, which also “relied heavily on civil 
law tradition, and contained many legal principles taken from Germany 
and Japan.”84 These codes altogether constitutes the so-called “Code of 
Six Laws” (Liu Fa Quan Shu).85 
The Code of Six Laws presents “the complete reception of the 
civil law tradition in China”,86 but this does not mean a complete break 
with the past Confucian law. Zhang indicates that: “Despite the strong 
influence of civil law tradition, mainly in the areas of legal philosophy 
and jurisprudence, no clear cut distinction was ever made between 
Chinese legal tradition and the contemporary legal system, especially 
with respect to the deeply-rooted concept of Li.”87 In other words, civil 
law is a modern legal layer superimposed upon the previous Confucian 
legal layer. At another point, the later socialist regime abolished the 
Code of Six Laws, but “the civil law feature was not diminished; 
instead, it was actually carried over and strengthened in the modern 
legal system of China.”88 That means civil law remains a legal layer in 
the contemporary Chinese legal system. 
Like China, civil law was also introduced in Vietnam from the 
West. However, the difference is that the process of transplantation of 
civil law in Vietnam was the consequence of French colonialism. The 
French colonists enacted three separate civil codes in three Vietnamese 
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regions: the Abbreviated Civil Code 1883 in Cochinchina (south), the 
Civil Code Implements in the Vietnamese Courts in Tokin (north) 1983, 
and the Central Vietnam Civil Code 1936 in Annam (centre).89 In 
addition, the colonialist also enacted the Vietnamese Commercial Code 
in 1942 and numerous regulations concerning civil and commercial law 
issues.90 Moreover, the colonists “seconded French legal personnel 
including judges, court officials, and lawyers to administer the 
system.”91 French civil law’s influence on Vietnam has been 
summarized in the following words: 
The French heritage remains heavy in the entire legal system, 
military and civilian. The older, more renowned lawyers and 
judges are often found to be French educated, French and non-
English speaking. Professional works are often published in 
French. The French trappings as well as institutions are adapted by 
the Vietnamese, and these are superimposed over the Vietnamese 
society without much change. The Code Napoleon influence is 
naturally strong, and the civil code system, as distinguished from 
the common law, is employed. Trial by jury is not employed, the 
technique of cross-examination is severely limited, and the 
authority of an examining magistrate is much enlarged as 
compared with US or common law practice.92 
French civil law continues to influence on Vietnam even after the 
country regained independence from France. John Gillespie observes 
that: “Vestiges of colonial legality lingered for over a decade after the 
1946 Constitution declared Vietnam independent from French rule.”93 
Even under the “Renovation” (Đổi mới) period since 1986, the first 
Civil Code of the socialist regime firstly enacted in 1995 have several 
provisions deriving from the colonial Civil Code of Annam, such as the 
provisions on mortgages, pledges, and suretyship.94 
It has been seen that civil law has been transplanted into China 
and Vietnam in early twentieth century. However, the mechanisms of 
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legal transplants in the two countries are different. Civil law was 
imposed in Vietnam through colonial power. Differently, although the 
China was confronted with the western powers, it was not formally 
colonized and therefore has freedom to choose which models of law to 
borrow. Why is civil law rather than common law the referred model 
for legal transplant in China? One may argue that this is because the 
civil law is consistent with the Chinese legal tradition of codification 
of legal norms. However, law in traditional China is also consistent 
with the common law tradition. Confucian legal theory and Confucian 
law focus on fundamental moral principles as the foundation of the 
legal system, which is not different from common law. Moreover, 
Confucian legal theory and Confucian law also underline the necessity 
of following established traditional norms, which is consistent with the 
common law’s concept and practice of precedents. In fact, the fact that 
China transplanted civil law rather than common law is mainly because 
civil law as a kind of positive law is transplantable in a short period of 
time, while the development of common law relies on the natural 
evolution over a long period of time.95 In early twentieth century, the 
Chinese government needs to reform the legal system in a short time to 
cope with the immediate challenges from the western powers, and the 
transplantation of civil law can meet with this demand. 
D. Socialist Law 
1. Transplantation 
In both China and Vietnam, the current legal system is dominated 
by the layer of socialist law transplanted from the former Soviet Union. 
Socialist law is associated with Marxist economic theory and soviet 
law. Socialist law is defined by these concepts and principles: “socialist 
legality” which underlines the use of law as an instrument for the state 
to control the society and citizens’ strict and unanimous application of 
law; “vanguardism” or the leading role of the communist party as the 
single ruling party; “democratic centralism” or the rejection of the 
separation of power in favour of the centralization of power into the 
supreme “soviet” or the national assembly; the “public ownership” of 
means of productions leading to the state’s controlling of the national 
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economy and national economic resources (including lands); and the 
“citizens’ rights” granted (and withdrawn) by the state.96 
After defeating the Nationalist Party of China and creating the 
communist government, the People’s Republic of China, in 1949, the 
Communist Party of China abolished the Six Codes and other laws of 
the Nationalist Government.97 Zhang explains: “This abolition was part 
of major effort to remove the capitalist influences and to establish a 
new socialist legal system.”98 In the course of creating the socialist 
legal system, the new communist government followed the Soviet legal 
system. “Consequently, almost all laws and regulations promulgated in 
the country in early 1950s, including the 1954 Constitution, evidenced 
a clear Soviet influence.”99 During this period (1949-1957):  
[a] massive project of Soviet assistance was launched, involving 
‘roughly ten thousand’ Soviet advisors who came to teach in 
China. The concept of a universal socialist legal system for new 
communist states was a major area of collaboration in this ‘golden 
age’ of Sino-Soviet cooperation. During this period, Chinese legal 
education ‘was totally under the guidance of Soviet experts.’ A 
survey of Russian-language Soviet literature on Chinese legal 
development showed that Soviet and Chinese models were 
converging at this point.100 
However, the Cultural Revolution initiated by Mao Zedong 
induced “legal anarchy”: law schools were shut down and formal laws 
were absent.101 After Mao’s death, the development of law in China 
revived. Particularly, the economic reform program called “reform and 
opening-up” (gaige kaifang) led by Deng Xiaoping has resulted in the 
enactment of numerous laws.102 “No matter the rhetoric, legal 
reformers in Deng’s China had little choice but to lean heavily on the 
institutions, texts, and ideas of the Soviet socialist model in the early 
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stages of restoring formal legality in the modern Chinese legal 
system.”103 
In 1997, the Communist Party of China decided to establish a 
“socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics.”104 But the party’s 
explanation of the “Chinese characteristics” “offers little meaningful 
substance, but instead is simply a political slogan.”105 Zhang identifies 
two “features” of the Chinese socialist legal system, namely the 
leadership of the communist party and the socialist concept of public 
ownership.106 However, these are the common features of the socialist 
regimes rather than distinctive to China. 
Like China, Vietnam also borrowed socialist law from the former 
Soviet Union. This process began in the 1960s when the communist 
government dominated North Vietnam.107 After national unification in 
1974, socialist law was borrowed and applied throughout the country. 
As the embodiment of the instrumentalist nature, socialist law 
developed in Vietnam before the Renovation period was mainly public 
law. The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
promulgated in December 1980, strictly adhered to the 1977 
Constitution of the USSR, evident by the confirmations of the principle 
of dictatorship of the proletariat, the exclusive leadership of the 
Communist Party, the centrally planned economy, citizen’s duties and 
statist rights, and the Leninist constitutional structure consisting of the 
supreme National Assembly, the collective presidency called Council 
of State, the subordinate government called Council of Ministers, the 
procucracies, and the courts. 108 
The Communist Party of Vietnam initiated an important economic 
reform program known as Đổi mới (Renovation) in 1986, which was 
meant to transform the centrally planned economy into the “socialist-
oriented market economy,” comparable to Deng’s gaige kaifang 
program.109 The Renovation campaign allowed and stipulated certain 
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degree of economic liberalization: decollectivization of agriculture, 
private property, private companies, and foreign investments.110 To 
meet the new demands of renovation of the nation, a new Constitution 
was adopted in April 1992. It confirmed the concept of “socialist-
oriented market economy,” allowed the development of private 
economic sectors, but basically remained the Leninist constitutional 
structure with some minor changes.111 
More recently, a new constitution was adopted in Vietnam in 
2013, which introduces more human rights and some new concepts 
(such as controlling the state power), but confirms fundamental 
socialist features which reflect the soviet legal legacy. To illustrate, it 
confirms the “socialist rule of law state” and class-based collective 
mastery:  
“The State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a socialist rule 
of law state of the People, by the People and for the People. The 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam is the country where the People are 
the masters; all the state power belongs to the People and is based 
on the alliance of the working class, the peasantry and the 
intelligentsia.”112  
It establishes the aspirations and goals to the socialist paradise: “[t]he 
state guarantees and promotes the People’s mastery; acknowledges, 
respects, protects and guarantees human rights and citizens’ rights; 
implements the objectives of prosperous people, state powers, 
democracy, justice, civilization, and all that people enjoy that is 
abundant and free for a happy life with conditions for all-round 
development.”113 It confirms the leadership of the Party over the state 
and the society and “Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Ho Chi Minh 
Thought” as its ideology.114 The Constitution confirms the principle of 
democratic centralism: “The State . . . practices the principle of 
democratic centralism.”115 It provides for statist rights: “Citizens’ 
rights are inseparable from citizens’ duties. Everyone has the duty to 
respect the rights of others. Citizens are responsible to practice their 
duties to the State and society. The practice of human rights and 
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citizens’ rights cannot infringe national interests and legal and 
legitimate rights and interests of others.”116 It stipulates the politicized 
military: “The people’s armed forces shall show absolute loyalty to the 
Fatherland, the People, the Party and the State”.117 It confirms that “The 
Vietnamese economy is a socialist-oriented market economy with 
multi-forms of ownership multi-sectors of economic structure; the state 
economic sector plays the leading role.”118 It establishes the state 
ownership of all lands.119 The Constitution also requires the People’s 
Courts and the People’s Procuracies to safeguard the socialist regime, 
among other things.120 Finally, it also establishes several social policies 
in the direction towards to socialism:  
“The State shall invest in the development of the protection and 
care of the People’s health, provide health insurance for the entire 
people and exercise a priority policy of health care for ethnic 
minorities, highlanders, islanders and people living in extremely 
difficult socio-economic conditions.”121 
Further, “[t]he State shall create equal opportunities for citizens to 
enjoy social welfare, develop a system of social security, and provide 
a policy assisting the elderly, the disabled, the poor and people with 
other difficult circumstances” poor people, and other disadvantaged 
people” and “[t]he State and society shall provide a favourable 
environment for the growth of the Vietnamese family which is 
prosperous, progressive, and happy; create Vietnamese people who are 
healthy, cultured, profoundly patriotic, unified, independent and 
responsible.” 122 
We have seen that socialist law has been transplanted from the 
Soviet Union into China and Vietnam and has remained its influence 
in the two countries nowadays. The process of transplantation of 
socialist law in China and Vietnam is determined by the fact the two 
countries were the members of the soviet camp. After the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam have remained the socialist 
regime, which explains the continuity of not only the socialist political 
structure but also socialist law. 
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2. Transformation 
Since China and Vietnam introduced the economic reform 
program, socialist law has been remained but experienced a significant 
transformation, characterized by the enactment of a tone of formal law 
regulating virtually all aspects of the society. Celebrating its 
achievements in making formal law, the Chinese government said:  
“Since New China was founded, and particularly since the policy 
of reform and opening up was introduced in 1978, China has made 
remarkable achievements in its legislation work. By the end of 
August 2011, the Chinese legislature had enacted 240 effective 
laws including the current Constitution, 706 administrative 
regulations, and over 8,600 local regulations. As a result, all legal 
branches have been set up, covering all aspects of social 
relations.”123  
To illustrate, consider the following details: 
 Laws for implementing the policy called “one country, two 
systems”: The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, and the Basic Law of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region.124 
 Laws for promoting socialist market economy: General 
Principles of the Civil Law, Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned 
by the Whole People, Law on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint 
Ventures, Law on Foreign-funded Enterprises, Patent Law, 
Trademark Law, Copyright Law, Economic Contract Law, Law 
on Enterprise Bankruptcy, Company Law, Partnership Enterprise 
Law, Law on Commercial Banks, Law on Township Enterprises, 
Anti-Unfair Competition Law, Law on the Protection of 
Consumers’ Rights and Interests, Product Quality Law, Auction 
Law, Guaranty Law, Maritime Code, Insurance Law, Negotiable 
Instruments Law, Law on Urban Real Estate Administration, 
Advertising Law, Law on Certified Public Accountants, 
Arbitration Law, Audit Law, Budget Law, Law on the People’s 
Bank of China, Foreign Trade Law, and Labor Law.125 
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 Laws for joining the World Trade Organization (WTO): 
Securities Law, Contract Law, Law on Bid Invitation and 
Bidding, Trust Law, Law on Individual Proprietorship 
Enterprises, Law on the Contracting of Rural Land, Government 
Procurement Law; revisions of the Foreign Trade Law, Law on 
Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, Law on Chinese-Foreign 
Cooperative Joint Ventures, Law on Foreign-funded Enterprises, 
Patent Law, Trademark Law, and Copyright Law.126 
 Laws for dealing with social, cultural, and environmental issues: 
Higher Education Law, Law on Prevention and Control of 
Occupational Diseases, Law on the Protection of Cultural Relics, 
Environmental Protection Law, Law on the Prevention and 
Control of Water Pollution, Law on the Prevention and Control 
of Atmospheric Pollution, Marine Environmental Protection 
Law, and Pharmaceuticals Administration Law, Social Insurance 
Law, Labor Contract Law, Employment Promotion Law, Food 
Safety Law, Law on Renewable Energy, Circular Economy 
Promotion Law, and Law on Environmental Impact 
Assessment.127 
 Laws for building state institutions: Law on Administrative 
Penalty, Law on Legislation, Law on State Compensation, 
Judges Law, Public Procurators Law, Law on the Supervision of 
Standing Committees of People’s Congresses at All Levels, 
Administrative Licensing Law, and Administrative Coercion 
Law.128 
 Laws concerning justice, crimes, and procedures: Criminal Law, 
Criminal Procedure Law, Civil Procedure Law, Administrative 
Procedure Law, People’s Mediation Law, Law on Labor Dispute 
Mediation and Arbitration, and Law on Lawyers.129 
Like China, Vietnam has developed a sophisticated system of 
formal legal rules which cover almost every aspect of the society. 
While formal law in China has been documented by other scholars,130 
formal law in Vietnam has not yet been received sufficient academic 
attention, and hence is examined in greater details in this section. Since 
Vietnam launched the Renovation campaign in 1986, the party-state 
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has had a serious concern of governance by formal law. To illustrate, 
the post-Renovation Constitution enacted in 1992 stipulated in Article 
12 that “The state shall govern the society through law.” In 2005, the 
Politburo introduced the Resolution 48-NQ/TW on the Strategy to 
Construct and Perfect the Vietnamese Legal System from Now to 2010 
with a Vision to 2020 (hereinafter, 2005 Legal Reform Strategy).131 The 
party believed that law has been developed during nearly two decades 
of Renovation, but it is imperative to develop the legal system 
comprehensively with a long-term plan. After ten years implementing 
this strategy, on 04 April 2016, the Politburo issued the Conclusion 
No.01-KL/TW on the continuous implementation of the strategy with 
the detailed plan of legal reform from 2016 to 2020.132 
Another indicator of the party-state’s serious concern of formal 
law is the enactment of the law on making formal law. Formally called 
as “Law on Enactment of Normative Legal Documents”, this law was 
first enacted 1996 and replaced by subsequent versions in 2004, 2008, 
and recently 2015. According to the current version, formal legal rules 
are promulgated with different types of legal instruments and by 
different legal institutions. The legal validity of these legal rules is 
hierarchical. For example, “by-law” documents must conform to 
legislations which are in turn under the Constitution- the supreme law 
of the land. The law also provides for complex processes of law-
making (not constitution-making which is provided in the Constitution 
itself) and supervising the consistence among the legal instruments. 
The Law on Enactment of Normative Legal Documents indicates the 
party-state’s real grave concern on making formal legal rules and 
structuring the sophisticated formal rule-making process. 
Quantitatively, during the post-Renovation period, Vietnam has 
enacted a tone of regulations. I relied on the online database of 
Vietnamese law called Thư viện Pháp luật (Law Library) 
                                                                                                                         
131. Bộ Chính trị [Politburo], 48-NQ/TW, Nghị Quyết Về Chiến Lược Xây Dựng Và 
Hoàn Thiện Hệ Thống Pháp Luật Việt Nam Từ Nay Đến Năm 2010, Định Hướng Đến Năm 
2020 [Resolution On The Strategy To Construct And Perfect The Vietnamese Legal System 
From Now To 2010 With A Vision To 2020”]. 
132. Bộ Chính trị [Politburo], Kết luận số 01-KL/TW, ngày 04/4/2016 của Bộ Chính trị 
về việc tiếp tục thực hiện Nghị quyết số 48-NQ/TW của Bộ Chính trị khóa IX về Chiến lược 
xây dựng và hoàn thiện hệ thống pháp luật Việt Nam đến năm 2010, định hướng đến năm 2020. 
[Conclusion No. 01-KL/TW, dated 4 April 2016 on the Implementation of Resolution on the 
Strategy to Construct and Perfect the Vietnamese Legal System from Now to 2010 With a Vision 
to 2020]. 
2017] THE LAW OF CHINA AND VIETNAM 161 
(http://thuvienphapluat.vn) to create figures in the Appendix.133 The 
quantitative data was coded till 6 November 2016. The number of 
regulations (154.507) enacted during around post-Renovation thirty 
years (1987-2016) exceeds around 19 times those (8.029) enacted in 
the previous fifty years (1936-1986). 
Figure 1 demonstrates that the number of regulations have 
remarkably increased over post-Renovation years. While there were 
only 309 regulations in 1987, the number dramatically increased to 
15.4507 by 6 November 2016. Particularly, in the 21st century when 
the socialist market economy has been basically established and 
Vietnam has gradually integrated into the world market, the country 
has promulgated thousands of regulations. 
Figure 3 indicates that formal laws have covered different areas 
of society. The number of formal laws on the governing structure is 
highest. Important laws for legal institution-building include the 
Constitution and organic laws on major state branches. The 
Constitution and these constitutional laws are revised and replaced 
several times during the last three decades. The current Constitution 
was enacted in late 2013, following the enactment of revision of 
organic laws, including: Law on Organization of the National 
Assembly (2014), Law on Organization of the Government (2015), 
Law on Organization of the People’s Courts (2014), and Law on 
Organization of the People’s Procucracies (2014). The implementation 
of the Renovation policy requires formal legal framework for the 
operation of the emerging market, which explains the huge amount of 
formal laws for the market. Important legislative laws for the market 
are enacted, revised, and replaced several times in the last three 
decades. The current important laws for the market include: Civil Code 
(2015), Enterprise Law (2014), Investment Law (2014), Real Estate 
Business Law (2014), Securities Law (2006, amended 2011), 
Intellectual Property Law (2005, amended 2009), Law on the State 
Bank of Vietnam (2010), Law on Finance (2005), Competition Law 
(2005), Bankruptcy Law (2014), Law on Commercial Arbitration 
(2010), and Corporative Law (2012), Labor Code (2012), and Land 
Law (2016). Economic transformation also creates a number of social, 
cultural, and environmental problems, which explains the high 
numbers of formal laws enacted to deal with these. Important current 
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legislative laws in this area include: Law on Social Security (2014), 
Housing Law (2014), Law on Residence (2013), Law on 
Environmental Protection (2014), Law on Anti-Corruption (2012), 
Ordinance on Population (2008), and Ordinance on Anti-Prostitution 
(2003). In the areas of laws dealing with offences, important documents 
are Law on Administrative Offences (2012) and Criminal Code (2015). 
Mayor procedure laws include: Civil Procedure Code (2015), Criminal 
Procedure Code (2015), and Administrative Procedure Law (2015). 
Legislative laws are just small number of legal documents in the 
Vietnamese legal system. Figure 4 indicates that to implement 366 
documents of legislative laws, legal institutions in different levels from 
the central Government to communal governors have enacted a 
mountain of by-law documents. Vietnamese law is therefore popularly 
described as a “jungle of law.”134 Particularly, the number of decisions 
is highest, including 99.823 documents. This is due to the fact that this 
type of document is the most popular form of regulation which can be 
issued by many authorities, namely President of State, Prime Minister, 
heads of ministerial bodies, and hundreds of local governors from the 
provincial to communal levels. 
A huge amount of regulation is enacted my ministry-level bodies. 
Figure 5 demonstrates that ministry-level institutions have 
promulgated a gigantic amount of by-law documents to exercise their 
administrative power and to implement legislative laws. Most notable 
are the institutions concerning state finance, such as the Ministry of 
Finance and the State Bank. Given that Vietnam is an agricultural 
country, a number of regulations are issued from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development. 
The context of formal law in Vietnam has been significantly 
complicated by thousands of regulations issued by local governments 
to implement central laws and to govern local affairs. Figure 6 in the 
Appendix indicates that big and prosperous provinces, such as Hanoi 
and Hồ Chí Minh City, have considerably higher number of 
regulations. 
The party-state’s concern is not only rule-making but also 
ensuring that the rules meet with normative requirements of formal law. 
The foremost aim of the 2005 Legal Reform Strategy is “to construct 
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and perfect a legal system that is synthetic, consistent, enforceable, 
public, and transparent.”135 
The party-state has achieved these goals to some extent. The 
formal legal rules are publicly promulgated. After enactment, legal 
instruments are published in national gazette. The party-state has had 
efforts to make formal law accessible. Several state institutions, like 
the National assembly, the Government, and the Ministry of Justice, 
also create various online databases of Vietnamese law, which makes 
law accessible to the people. The Law on Legal Propaganda and 
Education (2012) is enacted to ensure citizens’ right to access to the 
law and their duty to study the law (Article 1). Governmental programs 
of legal aids are implemented to help law accessible to vulnerable 
groups, whose legal framework is the Law on Legal Aid (2006). In 
reality, the 2015 Justice Index report demonstrates that: “Overall, more 
citizens are accessing legal information from a more diverse range of 
information sources compared to previously. This explains the positive 
change in access to legal information and the improved legal 
knowledge of citizens.”136 
On the other hand, there is a significant gap between Vietnamese 
formal law and the anticipated goals. To illustrate, an empirical survey 
of the Central Institute for Economic Management in 2012 identified 
“Nine Nos” in the Vietnamese legal system: no sufficiency; no clarity; 
no certainty; no consistency; no transparency; no predictability; no 
reasonableness; no effectiveness; and no validity.137 In the review of 
ten years of implementation of the 2005 Legal Reform Strategy, the 
Party also explicitly acknowledges weakness in the nation’s legal 
system as follows: 
The legal system has not yet really perfect and synthetic; the 
effectiveness and the enforceability have not met with the actual 
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demands. In some areas, laws have lacked the stability; the 
predictability has not been high; the quality has not been 
guaranteed; the amendments and supplementations have been too 
frequent. The procedure of making the law has included too many 
stages, which made the process of enactment and enforcement 
slow. Legal enforcement is the weakest point in implementing the 
Resolution 48-NQ/TW. The delay to enact regulations to detail 
and instruct [legal implementation] has been relatively popular. 
The review, systematization, and codification of law have not yet 
forcefully practiced; legal popularization, propaganda and 
education has lacked critical solutions and have not yet been 
highly effective; staffs in charge with law-making have not yet 
been consolidated to meet with the demands of the duties; the 
supervision and checking of legal documents have not been often; 
the dealing with errors and violations has not yet been thorough; 
and legal enforcement in some places and sometimes has been 
undisciplined and lacked the high effectiveness of deterrence and 
education.138 
This problematic context is determined by, among other things, 
the authoritarian arrangement. To begin with, Vietnamese formal law 
is more instrumental than limiting. The nature of the Vietnamese 
authoritarianism characterized by the single leadership of the 
Communist Party is one of important factors determining the 
instrumentalist nature of Vietnamese formal law. When ruling by fiats 
and personal commands has been proven as damaging to political 
legitimacy, the party needs to turn to formal law in exercising its power. 
Through controlling the state from the capital to remote villages, the 
party is able make sure that party’s policies are formalized and 
institutionalized by formal law enacted by the different state agencies. 
Consequently, law is instrumental to the party-state. The fact that the 
majority of formal rules focus the state machinery, as described above, 
indicates that law is an instrument for the party-state to formalize and 
consolidate its power. Formal law regarding the state machinery is less 
concerned with limiting the officials. Formal constitutional rules 
containing in the Constitution and organic laws are mainly designed to 
structure and enhance the political power. Most important is the 
constitutional rule regarding the leadership of the Communist Party 
over the state and the society.139 To be sure, there are a few rules for 
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constitutional constraints, such as the rules on vote of confidence. 
Moreover, the huge regulations regarding the administrative system are 
primarily concerned with enhancing, using, rather than restraining the 
administrative power. Administrative law is basically the instrument 
for the state to control people. To be sure, some rules regarding 
administrative litigations allow the citizens to constrain administrative 
power in concrete cases. 
Another problem in Vietnamese formal law concerns the 
administrative regulations. As mentioned above, a fewer number of 
statutory laws can only be implemented through the huge amount of 
administrative regulations. Yet, legislations include very general rules 
which allow a wide space for administrative regulations. And, the 
administrative regulations do not simply interpret legislations. 
Administrative agents seize the space of legislations to extend their 
discretionary power. Although the legislative institutions have the 
constitutional power to supervise the consistence between 
administrative regulations and legislations, it is difficult for them to do 
so, given the mountain of administrative regulations and the part-time 
nature of the majority of the legislature’s members. Consequently, they 
have never practiced this power. Within the administrative system, the 
Ministry of Justice is in charge with checking the consistency of 
administrative regulations. This body is rather active in this work, but 
its work is only advisory. Instead, the issuing institutions retain the 
power to revise the challenged laws. In practice, the challenges by the 
Ministry of Justice have resulted in the issuing institutions’ revising or 
withdrawing the regulations in question.140 
The consequence of the extending of administrative discretions 
through administrative regulations is significant. Legislative laws may 
grant more freedom to citizens, but administrative regulations narrow 
it down. For example, the Enterprise Law 2005 guaranteed the freedom 
of business, but administrative regulations restricted this freedom by 
numerous rules regarding requirements, conditions, and licenses of 
conducting business, which gave more discretion to administrative 
agencies.141 As a matter of authoritarian arrangement, judicial review 
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is absent, and citizens are not allowed to challenge an administrative 
regulation with general effect in the courts for the reason that it violates 
their rights protected in the Constitution or/and legislations. The 
administrative courts are only allowed to hear appeals to administrative 
decisions affecting individual cases. 
But, as admitted by the party itself, the weakest point in the 
Vietnamese formal legal system concerns legal enforcement. Vice-
President and then President of the National Assembly Nguyễn Thị 
Kim Ngân lamented that: “In Vietnam, there is a very fine and strange 
law that the world does have, namely the Law on Legal Propaganda 
and Education. That means when there are laws, people do not follow. 
Therefore, the Law on Legal Propaganda and Education must be 
enacted, but the people still do not follow.”142 This situation is 
significantly divorced from the formalist rule of law ideal’s 
requirement that law must be obeyed. Empirical survey by the authors 
of the 2015 Justice Index confirms the popular culture of turning 
against legal institutions because of the problems associated with these 
institutions: 
Local authorities play an important role in receiving and dealing 
with citizens’ legal matters. Unclear procedures for dispute 
settlement, lengthy processing time and inefficiency in dispute 
resolution are the main reasons why disputants choose to solve 
problems by themselves or opt to use informal measures, instead 
of turning to local judicial institutions. 
The assistance offered by local state agencies in settling disputes 
and complaints has not been as effective as the assistance of 
lawyers and legal aid providers. 
Access to the court is still limited due to disputants’ concerns 
about costs, procedures and confidence in the integrity of judges 
and court staff.143 
So, one of the reasons for the people’s turn against formal law 
concerns the poor quality of the authoritarian legal institutions in 
delivering justice. Yet, this is not the whole of the story. Another reason 
concerns legal history and legal culture, which may need more 
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empirical verification. Formal law has a complex relationship with 
legal legacy. Formal law just locates at the top of the Vietnamese legal 
pyramid which includes multiple legal layers. Preexisting legal layers 
and informal social norms may render formal law ill-enforced. 
Vietnamese people are more familiar with living with their traditional 
legal culture, customs, and habits than with newly enacted formal legal 
rules. Vietnam is an agricultural country, and the majority of the 
population (around seventy percent) lives in rural areas. For them, 
village law, customary law, and traditional social-moral norms are 
more relevant than the Constitution and legislations. Regarding formal 
law, they may be concerned with administrative regulations enacted by 
communal governments directly relevant to their daily life. The 
urbanization has brought thousands of peasants to more modern cities 
together with their village mindset, which makes the legal culture of 
the emerging middle class in urban areas resonant with their 
hometown’s culture. Consequently, even in modern cities, informal 
rules prevail over formal rules in many cases. For example, in 
economic transactions, personal relationship and social network are in 
many cases more relevant than formal legal rules. In the administrative 
system, there is a popular saying on the hierarchy of influential factors 
in the appointment and promotion: “Nhất hậu duệ, nhì tiền tệ, ba quan 
hệ, bốn trí tuệ” [“Descendants first; money second; relationship third; 
intelligence fourth”]. 
E. Global Law. 
The final and newest layer of law in China and Vietnam is global 
law. Global law is “a multicultural, multinational, and 
multidisciplinary legal phenomenon finding its roots in international 
and comparative law and emerging through the international legal 
practice that was prompted by the globalization of the world 
economy.”144 Global law is promoted by “global players”, including 
“international organizations, international law practitioners, and 
universities.”145 The legal system in China and Vietnam is now added 
with global legal rules, norms, and doctrines, which has their roots in 
the law of western countries (not necessarily the countries dominated 
by the civil legal system) and international law. 
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Jianfu Chen points out the movement towards “assimilation”, 
“harmonization with international practice”, and “internationalization” 
of Chinese law, which began in 1992 when the Communist Party 
decided to establish a “socialist market economy.”146 He documents 
that: 
The leaders of the law-making authorities also explicitly endorsed 
bold adoption and the direct transplant of foreign laws. With such 
a legislative policy in place, the Maritime Code which had been in 
the making for over ten years and was primarily composed of 
borrowings from international conventions and practice, was not 
only adopted in 1992, but its adoption was heralded as an excellent 
example for harmonising Chinese law with international practice. 
Many long awaited codes, e.g. the Company Law (1993), the 
Foreign Trade Law (1994), the Arbitration Law (1994), the Audit 
Law (1994), the Securities Law (1995), the People’s Bank Law 
(1995), the Law on Commercial Banks (1995), the Law on 
Accounting (1995), and the Insurance Law (1995) were all 
adopted. Speedy revisions or additions were made to existing laws 
which were deemed inconsistent with international practice. 
Taxation laws, joint venture laws, intellectual property protection 
laws, the Criminal Procedure Law and the Criminal Law, and most 
recently, the Company Law, the Securities Law, all underwent 
major revisions. Further, China has now ratified a large number of 
international conventions dealing with international economic 
relations, especially intellectual property protection.147 
Another example is the case of the 1999 Contract Law, in which 
“the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
(1994) and the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods (1980) were the actual models, and in some places were 
copied article by article.148 Global law affects not only private law but 
also public law. As Chen illustrates, “the 1996–1997 (and again, the 
2011-12) revisions to the Criminal Procedural Law and Criminal Law 
were aimed at absorbing commonly accepted international standards 
on justice and the rule of law, rather than following any particularly 
legal tradition.”149 Chen finally concludes that: “With these 
                                                                                                                         
146. JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW:  CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 81 (2016). 
147. Id. at 82-83 (citations omitted). 
148. Id. at 85. 
149. Id. at 86. 
2017] THE LAW OF CHINA AND VIETNAM 169 
developments, the process is thus better described as the 
internationalisation, rather than the westernisation, of Chinese law.”150 
Like China, borrowing from global law is an important 
mechanism of legal development in Vietnam after the Renovation 
program was introduced in 1986. Private law (especially, the civil law 
and corporate law) have been developed in this line.151 For example, 
“the Enterprise Law (EL) enacted on 12 June, 1999 introduced 
comprehensive Western corporate governance rules. Principally 
borrowing Anglo-American company law principles, in one hundred 
and thirty-four articles the EL regulates directors’ duties, disclosure, 
members’ rights (especial those of minority shareholders), boards of 
management and inspection board rights and duties, dividend 
payments, conversion among corporate entities, dissolution, 
dissolution merger and liquidation.”152 Another example: “the key 
provisions of the Vietnamese Competition Law [2004], which prohibit 
anti-competitive behaviour, abuse of market dominance and other 
monopolistic activities, were loosely modelled on the European Union 
Competition Law.”153 Public law, like constitutional law, is also 
reformed with new global ideas. For example, the 1992 Constitution 
adopted the concept of “human rights”. The new Constitution in 2013 
further incorporated more human rights familiar in international human 
rights treaties, including: the right to life, right not to be expelled from 
home territory, right to private family life, presumption of innocence, 
right to appeal to higher court, right to favorable working conditions, 
prohibition of child labor, and the right to healthy environment.154 
The diffusion of global law in China and Vietnam has been driven 
by internal and external factors. Internally, domestic economic reform 
leads to the need of legal framework for the market, and the global law 
can offer solutions for this legal reform; the adoption of global law is 
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the mechanism to attract foreign investment; socialist leaders adopt 
global legal norms to integrate the countries into the global economic 
and political order; they also adopt global law to gain more 
international legitimacy, by which to enhance domestic legitimacy. 
Externally, international agencies (such as World Trade Organization, 
World Bank, and United Nations of Development Programme), foreign 
governments have sought to diffuse global law into China and Vietnam 
through different mechanisms, such as treaty negotiation and 
agreements, legal aid programs, and academic exchange programs.155 
One feature of the diffusion of global law in China and Vietnam 
is that this process is more prominent in private law (especially 
business law) than in public law. One of the most important reasons is 
that the adoption of global private law does not challenge the socialist 
regime while facilitate economic reform, which confer more legitimacy 
to the existing regimes. Global norms of public law can be adopted only 
to the extent that they can confer more legitimacy to the existing 
socialist regime rather than challenge it. This explains why Vietnam 
adopts more social, economic, and cultural human rights, but does not 
adopt institutions to implement constitutional rights, such as a 
constitutional review system or a human right committee.156 Similarly, 
Chinese government may adopt global private law but would regard 
institutions associated with liberal constitutionalism (such as judicial 
review, judicial independence, and the separation of powers) as 
dangerous for Chinese socialist regime.157 While global harmonization 
of business law is useful for economic development and global 
integration, constitutional law is the area for the Chinese government 
to maintain the “Chinese characteristics” because constitutional law is 
more expressive of national identity than business law. Unlike China, 
Vietnam does not have the exceptionalist thinking in developing public 
law, but also would not adopt the global public legal norms and 
institutions that are potentially destructive to the socialist regime. 
Finally, it should be underlined that there is less interaction 
between China and Vietnam during their process of adopting global 
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law. John Gillespie notes that during the early time of Renovation, 
“Vietnamese law-makers turned initially to China for legal 
inspiration”.158 For example, the provisions on special economic zones 
in the Foreign Investment Law of 1987 “drew heavily from the Sinic 
templates.” 159 However, Gillespie provides three reasons explaining 
the limits of Chinese influence on Vietnamese legal development: the 
border war between China and Vietnam in 1979; Vietnamese law-
makers knew more about Soviet and East German law than Chinese 
legal and economic development and Chinese language; and in the late 
1980s, “the Chinese legal model had not yet proved its capacity to 
generate sustained economic growth.”160 Now, the last reason may not 
be relevant, but the first two are enhanced by more developments, 
which explain the less legal exchange between China and Vietnam: the 
conflict between China and Vietnam over the Amphitrite and Spratly 
Islands, and increasing number of Vietnamese people studying law in 
the western countries and democratic East Asian countries, such as 
Japan. 
F. Conclusion 
It has been seen that Chinese and Vietnamese societies are not 
lawless, as there are many laws existing throughout their history. 
Different legal systems existed and played different role during 
different periods. During pre-modern time, for example, Confucian law 
played the dominant role, while indigenous law co-existed. Currently, 
socialist law has been the hegemonic layer of law in China and 
Vietnam, while elements of other legal layers have co-existed. The co-
existence of non-socialist legal layers means not only the concurrent 
application of other legal rules, processes and institutions but also the 
continuing influences of other legal ideas and legal cultures on the legal 
practices. 
II. INSTRUMENTALISM? STRATEGIC ACCOMMODATION OF 
THE RULE OF LAW 
Having documented the existence of law in China and Vietnam, 
the next question is whether their law has certain qualities of the rule 
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of law. Within this single article, I will focus on the current situation of 
law in the two countries.161 The rule of law is normally conceived as an 
antithesis to communism. For example, Martin Krygier argues that 
Marxism did not support legal restraints on power but offered 
“considerable support to the repressive, ideological and purely 
instrumental uses of law and the  rejection and destruction of the rule 
of law, which were characteristic of  communism.”162 However, there 
is a vast literature on the rule of law in China.163 Like China, during the 
post-soviet era, Vietnam has been committed to a certain degree of the 
rule of law, and this has also been examined by some scholars.164 To 
understand the rule of law in China and Vietnam, I propose a 
conceptual model of “strategic accommodation” of the rule of law. On 
that base, while the instrumental nature of the law has remained 
dominant in China and Vietnam, the socialist states have 
accommodated some forms of the rule of law as a strategic response to 
the need to consolidate the legitimacy of the socialist regimes. The 
conceptual model of “strategic accommodation” includes two 
components: accommodation and strategy. The idea of accommodation 
explains how the rule of law exists under socialism, while the idea of 
“strategy” explains why it is so. 
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A. Accommodation: How Is The Rule of Law Possible Under 
Socialism? 
Law under socialist regimes cannot be evaluated from the 
perspective of liberal legalism. If law under socialist regimes is 
assessed against substantive requirements of the rule of law specifically 
associated with civil liberty, it is hard to find the rule of law here. But, 
an exclusive employment of legal formalism is another misleading. 
While some scholars have correctly identified the practice of formal 
rule of law in socialist regimes like China,165 they tend to ignore or 
underestimate other non-formalist dimensions of the rule of law. In 
addition, existing formalist accounts of the rule of law fail to appreciate 
the complex interwoven and competition of different strands of the rule 
of law. Formal legal rules cannot operate neutrally. Rather, they 
complexly interact with other aspects of the rule of law. For example, 
the legal tradition of non-litigation in part explains why in resolving 
civil disputes the Chinese people tend to prefer mediation and informal 
institutions than formal legal institutions like courts.166 The substantive 
concepts of law also determine positively and negatively the context of 
formal law. Positively, the promotion of formal rule of law is 
underpinned by the consequentialist conceptualization that the rule of 
law can promote economic development. This legal consequentialism 
leads to the concerns of not only formal rules but also their substantive 
contents: property rights, contract rights, and freedom of conducting 
business. Negatively, the statist concept of law reduces formal law to 
an instrument to control civil liberty. 
To understand how the rule of law is possible under socialist 
regime, an accommodationist conceptualization of the rule of law is 
necessary. The idea of “accommodation” is useful to capture the 
practice of the rule of law under socialism. It refers to a special 
arrangement in which a certain mode is dominant while other modes 
are tolerated. In this regard, the socialist regime will retain the 
hegemony of socialist legality while tolerate some forms of the rule of 
law that may conflict with but would not substantively damage the 
socialist legality and the socialist regime in general. 
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Accommodationism would reject a clear dichotomy between the 
rule of law and authoritarianism. The rule of law is normally conceived 
a component of the transition from authoritarian regime to 
democracy.167 The implication is that the rule of law and 
authoritarianism are something that cannot co-exist in a single polity. 
This is a misleading. Even under well-established rule of law systems, 
legal authoritarianism can also be partially executed. In this case, the 
rule of law is still the hegemonic spirit of the polity, but authoritarian 
laws can be implemented in some aspects of the society under certain 
circumstances.168 To illustrate, Robert Diab investigates in the United 
States “law and policy defining four basic features of authoritarian 
legality, including the repudiation of absolute or “non-derogable” 
human rights in torture, indefinite detention, and targeted killing; the 
expansion of state secrecy and surveillance; judicial deference to 
executive discretion; and a reluctance to remedy serious rights 
violations, or be held accountable for them.”169 Conversely, even under 
well-established authoritarian systems like socialist regimes, the rule 
of law can also be partially accommodated. In this case, 
authoritarianism remains the hegemonic spirit of the polity, but the rule 
of law can also be implemented in some aspects of the society under 
certain circumstances. 
Accommodationism would adopt an idealist approach to the rule 
of law. As Richard H. Fallon argues, “The Rule of Law is an ideal that 
can be used to evaluate laws, judicial decisions, or legal systems.”170 
The rule of law is an ideal that humankind has tried to achieve in its 
broader course of pursuing just, decent, and organized society. The 
realization of the rule of law is “a matter of degree.”171 No legal system 
can realize the ideal of rule of law perfectly. “A legal system that on 
the whole comports with the Rule of Law may nevertheless include 
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regulations or decisions that do not.”172 In another extreme, a legal 
system that on the whole departs from the rule of law may nevertheless 
accommodate regulations or decisions that partially meet with the rule 
of law desiderata. That means the legal system of authoritarian regimes 
can achieve the rule of law ideal to a certain degree. With this 
conceptual ground, it can be expected that some expects of the socialist 
legal system may substantively depart from the rule of law ideals, while 
accommodate them in the other expects. Albert Chen recently discusses 
“differential degrees of compliance with the rule of law in different 
domains and contexts of the Chinese state and society.”173 To illustrate, 
he points out that: “There are certain types of court cases in which 
judicial professionalism, autonomy, and independence has developed 
considerably, while there are also ‘political sensitive’ cases in which 
the courts would defer to relevant party authorities.174 Drawing from 
empirical survey, Wang Yuhua also argues about “a partial form of the 
rule of law”175 in China. 
Accommodationism would also adopt the rule of law as a multi-
dimensional concept. Fallon’s typology of the rule of law ideal is useful 
in this regard. Accordingly, although the rule of law is a contested ideal, 
virtually all contested arguments about the rule of law ideal can be 
modelled by a historic, formalist, legal process, or substantive ideal 
type.176 Firstly, “A historicist ideal type of the Rule of Law, in order to 
be coherent, must be conceived as internal to a legal culture, form of 
life, hermeneutic circle, or interpretive community; meaning cannot be 
conceived as independent of culture, context, or shared 
understandings.”177 So, in historic rule of law ideal, legal actors are 
bound by pre-established legal legacy, legal culture, and shared 
underlining principles of an interpretive community. Secondly, under 
the formalist ideal type, to borrow Justice Antonin Scalia’s utterance, 
the rule of law means a law of rules.178 Rules are conceived as “a clear 
prescription that exist prior to its application and that determine 
appropriate conduct or legal outcomes.”179 The formalist rule of law is 
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underpinned by the assumption on “human being as rational planners 
and maximizers, who reasonably demand to know in advance the legal 
consequences of alternative courses of action.”180 Proponents of legal 
formalism include A.V. Dicey, Friedrich Hayek, John Rawls, Joseph 
Raz, and Lon L. Fuller.181 In particular, Fuller identifies eight 
requirements of formal rule of law or “legality”, including: generality, 
clarity, public promulgation, stability, prospective, free of 
contradiction, possible to obey, and the consistence between 
promulgated laws and their actual administration.182 Thirdly, the legal 
process type focuses procedural requirements in the development and 
application of legal norms.183 These include, for example, fairness, due 
process, and judicial review of legislative, executive, and 
administrative actions.184 Finally, the substantive ideal type of rule of 
law insists that “the forms of law- which may encompass rules, 
conventions of legal reasoning, and process of legal deliberation- are 
unintelligible as legal norms in the absence of rationally cognizable 
purposes that possess reasonable claims to moral allegiances.”185 
Ronald Dworkin, for example, insists on the individual rights as the 
substantive requirement of the rule of law.186 Frank Michelman’s 
“Law’s Republic” treats freedom under law as the substance of the rule 
of law.187 
The rule of law strands do not exist independently in a legal 
system. Rather, they are complexly interwoven and compete with each 
other.188 There may be relative priority of different rule of law strands 
in different legal systems. And within a legal system, there may be 
relative priority of a certain strand of the rule of law in different 
periods. Therefore, an account of the rule of law in different contexts 
must take into account the complex manifestation, interaction, and 
competition of different rule of law ideal types. Fallon suggests that: 
“To the extent that the ideal types reflecting conflicting values or 
approaches, a sound theory needs assign relative priorities, assess the 
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significance of greater or lesser departures from relevant desiderata, 
and identity the pertinence of various contextual factors.”189 
The socialist regimes in China and Vietnam have partially 
accommodated different strands of the rule of law. Consider first the 
partial existence of the historic type the rule of law. This is evidenced 
by the recent practice of “guiding cases,” a kind of case-law, in China 
and Vietnam. Recently, the supreme courts in both countries have 
drawn on their decisions to issue de facto biding decisions guiding the 
adjudication of the lower courts in similar cases.190 In this context, 
lower courts are constrained by the pre-established legal rules. But, the 
account of historic strand of the rule of law should go beyond the mere 
consideration of the binding of precedents or particular historic legal 
rules. The historic strand of the rule of law is also achieved when the 
arbitrariness of legal actors (e.g., politicians, law-makers, and judges) 
are constrained by the historic legal legacy, legal culture, and legal 
principles. The communist authorities in China and Vietnam cannot 
completely ignore other layers of law that have existed throughout their 
legal history. The communists’ development and application of law is 
also constrained by historicist legal norms, institutions, and shared 
principles of the respective interpretive communities. To illustrate, 
communist legal actors have to respect the rights of the indigenous 
peoples to live according to their own chthonic law. To some extent, 
they are also constrained by Confucian legal culture, as evidenced by 
its continued influence in different aspects of the legal system as 
documented above. 
That said, the historicist rule of law is partially practiced. In other 
words, communist legal actors are only partially constrained by 
historicist legal sources. Historicist legal sources can constrain but at 
the same time are manipulated by communist legal actors. Most 
importantly, without judicial review system, the communist authorities 
have the monopolist power to apply and interpret the historicist legal 
sources in the line with their interests. The revival of hương ước in 
Vietnam is an example. Hương ước is both expressive of the 
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indigenous identity of the communal community and instrumental to 
the implementation of the state’s policies at the village level. 
The second, formalist type of the rule of law is more remarkable 
in China and Vietnam, evidenced by the enactment of numerous formal 
laws. The promulgation of numerous formal legal rules indicates the 
regime’s commitment to formal legality in exercising the public power. 
Governing through formal law is at least better than lawless or ruling 
by personal fiats. Moreover, the socialist legal system meets with the 
some requirements of formalist rule of law ideal to some extent, such 
as publicity and enforceability. Without judicial review, the two 
countries have developed specific mechanism called “filing and 
review” to make sure that formal laws are free of contradiction.191 
The focus on formal law is due to epistemological and practical 
reasons. First, the promotion of formal law is consistent with the 
positivist view of the law endorsed by the socialist states as the 
consequence of the influence of Marxist legal philosophy. From this 
positivist perspective, law must come from the state rather than from 
the interpretative community, although the guiding cases can be 
tolerated to some extent when formal law is not available. Second, 
formal law meets with the socialist states’ imperative of regulating new 
areas emerged from the development of the market, the increasing 
complex society, and the need of more effective state institutions, 
which are the consequence of the implementation of the economic 
reform initiatives. Finally, formal law has empty contents192 and hence 
is not detrimental to the existing socialist regime. 
Third, legal process in China and Vietnam is basically 
authoritarian but also includes some rule of law elements. The judicial 
process is politically controlled but also has some elements of legal 
process rule of law ideal. Wang Yuhua argues that courts in China are 
independent and enforce the law equally in commercial realm but not 
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in political realm.193 The logic is that local governments in the regions 
where economic development relies more on foreign investment will 
foster the formal rule of law to attract foreign investment, but the rule 
of law will not be extended to the realm where the citizens seek to 
challenge the government action in courts.194 In the case of Vietnam, 
Nicholson argues that: “The contemporary Vietnamese court is 
concurrently a legal and political institution. Legal in that ideally it is 
bound by law, political in that ultimately it works for the party-state 
and must resolve matters in accordance with a complex hierarchy of 
influences, only once of which is law.”195 The political side is dominant 
and illustrates the authoritarian feature of the judicial process. The 
legislative and executive actions are not subjected to judicial review: 
conversely, the judicial process is controlled by the political powers. 
However, the legal side illustrates some partial achievement of the legal 
process rule of law ideal. At least in formal terms, some fair trail rights 
are constitutionally guaranteed, including the right to counsel, the right 
to public trial, and the prohibition of double jeopardy. Notably, the new 
2013 Constitution introduces more rights which aim to ensure the 
fairness in judicial process, namely, presumption of innocence, the 
right to a timely trial, the right to “fair” trial,196 and right to appeal to 
higher court.197 The new Criminal Procedural Code in 2015 introduces 
the principle of adversarial trial and extends the types and the rights of 
the defenders.198 These procedural developments are meant to limit the 
arbitrary powers of the judicial institutions. In practical terms, trials 
have been publicly held, which allows the public to supervise the 
judicial process. Some important cases have been even live televised. 
Professional lawyers are more active in the judicial process. The trials 
are predominantly inquisitorial but increasingly adversarial in recent 
years.199 
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Let’s now turn to consider the substantive type of the rule of law 
in China and Vietnam. The so-called “socialist rule of law state” 
(Chinese: shuhui zhuyi fazhiguo; Vietnamese: nha nuoc phap quyen xa 
hoi chu nghia) was adopted by the communist leaders of the respective 
countries in the middle of the 1990s, and was then enshrined in the 
national constitutions in China in 1999 and in Vietnam in 2001.200 
However, the substantive meanings of the “socialist rule of law state” 
are ambiguous. 
On 23 October, 2014, in the 4th Plenum of the 18th Congress of 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the party’s Central Committee 
passed a decision focusing on promoting the “socialist rule of law 
state”, called “Decision on Some Major Issues Concerning 
Comprehensively Promoting Governing the Country According to 
Law.”201 The Decision “persist[s] in marching the path of Socialist rule 
of law with Chinese characteristics, build a Socialist rule of law system 
with Chinese characteristics.”202 The Decision persists in these 
“principles”: the leadership of the Chinese communist party “within the 
scope of the Constitution and the law”; “the dominant position of the 
people”, including the protection of people’s basic rights and ensuring 
of their duties; equality of all “in the fact of the law”;203 “integrating 
ruling the country according to the law and ruling the country according 
to virtue”; and “starting from China’s reality.”204 This Decision is 
subject to controversial academic debates.205 In the case of Vietnam, 
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the “socialist rule of law state” is said to have the following distinctive 
characters: the leadership of the Vietnamese communist party, the 
supremacy of the constitution, all state powers belonging to the people, 
the unity of state powers, the promotion of the law together with 
enhancing education of social morality, human rights going hands in 
hands with the citizens’ duties and obligations to the state and the 
nation.206 So, there are several common features in the construction of 
the meanings of the “socialist rule of law state” in China and Vietnam. 
I contend that among the three western versions of the rule of law, 
the Anglo-American “rule of law”, the French État de droit, and the 
German Rechtsstaat, the version of “socialist rule of law state” is closer 
to the Germen version. The Anglo-American concept of the rule of law 
focuses on legal limitations of the state power to protect natural 
rights,207 and this is clearly contradictory to the socialist state’s strong 
concern on strengthening the control of the state over individuals 
through regulations. The French État de droit, characterized by the 
concept of constitutional state as legal protector of fundamental rights 
from legislative infringements,208 is also unsuitable to the socialist 
states which make the national legislatures the supreme body as the 
embodiment of unitary power. Instead, the German Rechtsstaat is more 
attractive to the socialist states.209 The evolution of this concept has a 
long history, associated with Kant’s philosophy and legal positivism.210 
Michel Rosenfeld summarizes the features of the German Rechtsstaat 
as follows: 
Like its Kantian counterpart, today’s Rechtsstaat enshrines 
fundamental rights above the realm of ordinary laws, although 
these rights are substantive rather than formal and differ 
significantly in content from their Kantian predecessors. On the 
other hand, like its positivistic predecessor, today’s Rechtsstaat 
institutionalizes legality, but it is a legality that is not merely 
dependent on consistency and predictability, but also contingent 
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on constitutional conformity and on the realization of 
constitutionally recognized substantive goals. This, in turn, tends 
to constitutionalize all politics and to convert the Rechtsstaat into 
a Verfassungsstaat (i.e., a state rule through the constitution) as 
some German scholars have argued.
 
Finally, even beyond 
constitutionalization as such, today’s Rechtsstaat judicializes 
realms, such as the promotion of welfare, which were clearly 
relegated to politics by its nineteenth century predecessors.211 
Like the German Rechtsstaat, the “socialist rule of law state” 
underlines governing through the law, constitutionalization of the state 
organization and operation, constitutional supremacy, and the 
protection of fundamental rights. The socialist states in China and 
Vietnam might have adapted the Rechtsstaat to generate the “socialist 
rule of law state”, the mélange of Rechtsstaat, socialist, and local 
elements. There are good reasons for this. The Rechtsstaat’s positivist 
view that the state is the exclusive channel of law is consistent with the 
socialist legality which equally underlines the statist nature of law. 
Moreover, the idea of governing through promulgated law is also 
attractive to the socialist states because this provides the justification 
for governing the transitional society through formal regulations. But, 
the German Rechtsstaat has both formal and substantive contents. It 
also stresses the constitutionally protected fundamental rights above 
ordinary law and politics.212 The socialist states might has adopted and 
adapted this idea with a commitment to constitutional supremacy and 
protection of constitutional rights, which can be regarded as the rule of 
law elements in the “socialist rule of law state.” This rule of law 
elements exist in tension with the socialist elements, such as the 
leadership of the communist party, the concentration of state power, 
and the statist rights of citizens. In addition, “socialist rule of law state” 
also includes elements reflecting the local values. This is evident in the 
emphasis on the role of moral values, which resonates with the 
Confucian tradition of the rule of virtue. In short, the version of 
“socialist rule of law state” is an ambiguous and dissonant ideology of 
substantive law in which socialist legal statism remains dominant, but 
some substantive ideas of the rule of law are partially adopted. 
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B. Strategy: Why Do Socialist Regimes Accommodate The Rule of 
Law? 
The strategic approach, which has been applied in economics, 
political science, and more recently legal studies, focuses on rational 
actors’ calculus of costs and benefits of “potential courses of action.”213 
As David Collier and Deborah L. Norden write, “a strategy is a calculus 
of behavior adopted to enhance the likelihood of achieving some goal, 
such as reform or democracy.”214 Applying the “strategic-realist 
approach” in comparative constitutional inquiry, Ran Hirschil argues 
that “The quest to increase benefits and lower risks and costs - most 
notably by enhancing regime legitimacy and stature, promoting 
centralization and fostering nation-building or locking in a certain set 
of contested worldviews and policy preferences- is a major determinant 
of constitutionalization.”215 
The strategic accounts are particularly relevant to socialist 
regimes in China and Vietnam where law and politics are 
indistinguishable. The socialist regimes that survive the fall of the 
Berlin Wall are dynamic enough to adjust themselves to the changing 
world, which explains their resilience.216 Nowadays, they have been 
operating under the domestic and international milieus substantively 
different from the Soviet era. Domestically, they have to consolidate 
the sociological base of legitimacy by their actual performance, and 
economic development is a key concern. The accommodation of some 
forms of the rule of law can benefit economic development and hence 
socialist elite’s legitimacy. Moreover, the socialist states also need to 
build state institutions, which is instrumental to its consolidated power 
and its legitimacy, because powers that are institutionalized can 
become stronger and more legitimate than personalized powers. Some 
forms of the rule of law can also be used for these institutional 
purposes. Internationally, the socialist countries like China and 
Vietnam have actively integrated politically and economically into to 
the global order. To acclimate to the changing world, the communist 
nations have been compelled to adapt its ideology, institutions, 
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economy, and law by, among other things, accommodating some forms 
of the rule of law familiar with the global community to gain more 
international legitimacy, which in turn can also consolidate domestic 
legitimacy. 
But, the socialist regimes have been confronted with the dilemma. 
On the one hand, the rule of law has the potential to ruin the socialist 
regimes. On the other hand, these regimes have to be dynamic enough 
to be resilient by, among other things, accommodating some forms of 
the rule of law. The solution for this is to adopt some realistic strategies 
to legal reform. These strategies must guarantee the hegemony of 
communist rule and the accommodation of the rule of law at the same 
time. The rule of law is accommodated to the extent that it will not 
substantively challenge the existing socialist regimes. To achieve this, 
the socialist regimes adopt the differential and partial strategies to legal 
reform: the rule of law can only be achieved differentially and partially. 
By this, legality under socialist regimes is transformative, not 
revolutionary. The whole practice of the rule of law (with the 
substantive adoption and practice of precedents, judicial review, 
judicial independence, the separation of power, multi-party system, 
free elections, and civil-political rights) will damage the socialist 
regime, for which this is impossible. But, the “partial form of the rule 
of law,” as Wang Yuhua argues,217 is a legal reform, not legal 
revolution, for which this is possible. 
The “differential” strategy means that the socialist regimes have 
different approaches to different types of the rule of law and the 
application of the rule of law in different areas of the society. This is 
resonated with Albert Chen’s argument.218 First, the socialist regimes 
practice different types of the rule of law but would have priority to the 
types that are more instrumental to their legitimacy and less damaging 
to the existence regimes. This explains their prioritization of the 
formalist type of the rule of law. Second, within a single type, the rule 
of law is applied differently in different realms. As Wang’s study 
suggests, the Chinese government can accommodate the (legal process) 
rule of law in commercial realm, but not in political realm.219 But, this 
differential approach is not limited to the procedural rule of law. On the 
substantive rule of law, the socialist governments may have different 
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strategy to different substances of law. For example, they can 
accommodate more social economic rights than civil-political rights, 
as the former can consolidate the sociological foundation of the 
political legitimacy, while the latter would open the door for the 
citizens to challenge the existing regime. To illustrate, the freedom to 
do business is more accommodated than the freedom of speech and 
expression. 
III. ASSIMILATIONISM? TWO DISTINCTIVE LEGAL SYSTEMS 
Having demonstrated that law in China and Vietnam has a rich 
history, and that the law embodies some rule of law qualities, the next 
question is whether there are distinctive legal systems in these 
countries. I argue that there are two legal systems practiced in China 
and Vietnam, namely the Confucian legal system and the socialist legal 
system, which are separate from other traditional, and modern legal 
systems of the world. However, before considering these legal systems, 
it is necessary to define what constitutes a legal system. 
A. Legal System 
For the purpose of this study, I deploy the concept of “legal 
system” rather “legal families” or “legal tradition” although the two 
later may have virtues in their own ways. Unlike the concept of legal 
families, the concept of legal system does not focus on legal methods, 
legal sources, and style of trials.220 Unlike the concept of legal tradition, 
the concept of legal system is not primarily concerned with the 
transmission of legal information across generations.221 To be sure, all 
of these elements are reflected in the concept of legal system. 
Lawrence M. Friedman defines a legal system as including three 
elements, namely: structure, substance, and culture.222 The structure of 
the legal system refers to “the skeleton or framework, the durable part, 
the part that gives a kind of shape and definition to the whole.”223 This 
legal structure is consisted of the organizations, sizes, jurisdictions of 
the basic branches of state: the judiciary, the legislature, and the 
executive.224 The second element of the legal system is its substance 
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defined as “the actual rules, norms, and behavior patterns of people 
inside the system.”225 The third element is legal culture, or “the 
people’s attitude toward law and the legal system- their beliefs, values, 
ideas, which concerns the legal system.”226 Friedman underlines that: 
“the legal culture, in other words, is the climate of social thought and 
social force that determine how law is used, avoided, or abused.”227 
Friedman provides a useful framework to conceptualize a legal 
system. However, in addition to the three elements, there may be a forth 
element namely the jurisprudential foundation of a legal system. 
Drawing on the work of post-modern legal comparativists,228 this refers 
to the fundamental principles, concepts, ideas, that underline the whole 
legal system. The jurisprudential foundation shapes the creation and 
operation of legal institutions, the substantive contents of the law, and 
the way people use or avoid the law. Jurisprudential element is different 
from the cultural element in Friedman’s construction as the latter only 
refers to the way of legal practice. 
All in all, a legal system can be conceptualized as including four 
elements: jurisprudence, structure, substance, and culture. With this in 
mind, we will consider the Confucian legal system and the socialist 
legal system in the next sections. 
B. The Confucian Legal System 
The Confucian legal system can be considered a distinctive legal 
system as it has distinctive jurisprudence, structure, substance, and 
culture. The jurisprudential foundation of the Confucian legal system 
is the Confucian philosophy. The Confucian legal system is underlined 
by distinctive Confucian concepts, principles, and doctrines, such as, 
ren (humaneness), li (rituals), yi (righteousness), zhong (loyalty), xiao 
(filial piety), five relationships (ruler - ruled, father-son, husband-wife, 
elder brother -younger brother, friend-friend), junzi (gentlemen), 
zhengming (rectification of names), and minben (people-as-basis). The 
conceptual foundation of the Confucian legal system is drawn on 
classical Confucianism, but the evolution of this legal system in 
different periods of time in China was accompanied by the evolution 
of Confucianism. Consequently, the jurisprudential foundation of 
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Confucian legal system evolved over time, with the reconstruction of 
the classical Confucian ideas and concepts and the generation of new 
ideas and concepts of neo-Confucians. For example, the Confucian 
legal system in the Sung dynasty (1127–1279) in China was 
underpinned by Sung Neo-Confucians, particularly, Zhu Xi (1130-
1200), who integrates “law closely with both morality and his 
metaphysical views on li (principle).229 
The second element of the Confucian legal system is structure. 
The monarch, as an institution, is the most important element in the 
Confucian legal structure. A legitimate monarch is required to work for 
the happiness of the people, as stipulated by the concept of minben 
(people-as basis.) A physical king must also act in accordance with the 
expected virtues and functions of an ideal king, as suggested by the 
doctrine of zheng-ming (rectification of names).230 In addition to the 
monarchial institution, there are several distinctive institutions 
designed to implement the Confucian philosophical concepts and 
principles regarding the virtues of the rulers and officers, including: the 
royal examination system, the imperial lectures, the censorate, and the 
historic offices.231 
The third element of the Confucian legal system is its substance. 
The substance of the Confucian legal system includes the rules and 
norms. The sources of these rules and norms include Confucian 
classics, imperial codes, imperial regulations, case-law, and customary 
law.232 The contents of the rules and norms cover different aspects, not 
merely crimes and punishments, although the Confucian legal rules and 
norms are normally backed by criminal sanctions. The substance of the 
Confucian legal system extended from criminal law to criminal and 
civil procedures, litigation, family law, land law, property law, 
administrative law, and even constitutional law (fundamental rules and 
norms regulating the imperial power). To be sure, the Confucian legal 
system does not have a clear distinction of these areas of law as modern 
legal systems. 
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Finally, the Confucian legal system has distinctive legal culture. 
One example is the culture of non-litigation (wusong) stemming from 
the related doctrine of social harmony and the disregard of the pursuit 
of material interests in the name of moral self-cultivation.233 This 
culture is significantly different from the litigious tendency in liberalist 
and individualist legal culture.234 Another culture is called “legalization 
of morality,”235 or the protection and enforcement of moral values by 
law, as opposed to the liberalist trend to separation of law from 
morality, underpinned by the concept of neutral government.236 In other 
words, in the Confucian legal culture, there is no a clear distinction 
between law and morality. Last but not least, the Confucian legal 
system has generated what can be called “Confucian constitutional 
ethics” which emphasizes the necessity of political leaders’ acquiring 
moral virtues and their propriety in practicing political power. This is 
different from liberal constitutionalism which focuses mainly on the 
political leaders’ observation of constitutional rules.237 
Nowadays, in China and Vietnam, Confucianism has been no long 
the official ideology, and the Confucian legal system has been no 
longer implemented. The jurisprudential, structural, and substantial, 
and cultural elements of the current legal systems in the two countries 
are significantly informed by socialist and global elements. Yet, as 
mentioned above, some Confucian values and ideas, such as filial piety, 
are still reflected in the modern law in China and Vietnam. There is 
another area of the legal system in which the Confucian influence is 
prominent, namely legal culture. The triumph of communism, the 
borrowing of socialist law, and the diffusion of global law have 
virtually removed the Confucian, structural, and substantial elements 
from the legal system. However, the Confucian legal culture ingrains 
in the mindset of the people for thousand years and operates at the sub-
conscious level, and therefore, is difficult to be eradicated within a few 
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decades. Consequently, the Confucian legal culture remains its 
influences. The tendency to avoid going to the court, to legalize moral 
values (as the cases of filial piety law), and to aspect political leaders 
to have moral values is still evident in China and Vietnam. Even global 
legal scripts are also viewed, understood, and re-interpreted by the local 
people with the infusion of Confucian meanings.238 The Confucian 
influence on legal culture in China and Vietnam may be un-conscious: 
the people may not aware of the Confucian roots in their legal behavior 
and attitudes. Finally, the contemporary influence of the Confucian 
legal culture is fragmentary rather comprehensive as it was during the 
imperial time. 
C. The Socialist Legal System 
During the soviet era, comparative law scholars added the third 
legal system, namely socialist law, to the two familiar legal systems 
(common law and civil law).239 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
socialist law has virtually disappeared in comparative law literature.240 
John Quigley in his influential article published during the Soviet era 
concluded that socialist law “contains features,” but “those points of 
difference have not removed socialist law from the civil law tradition,” 
because of “the historical connection of socialist law to civil law and 
the continuing relevance in socialist law of civil law rules, methods, 
institutions, and procedures.”241 Wring after the soviet era, Inga 
Markovits argued that socialist law was not dead simply because it did 
not exist: the alleged features of socialist law are not confined to the 
law of the former socialist countries.242 Recently, William Partlett and 
Eric C Ip revitalized the debate, arguing that socialist law has 
distinctive features, and that socialist law has not been dead as it has 
still influenced the current Chinese public law.243 I argue that socialist 
law is a distinctive legal system which is still implemented in China 
and Vietnam. 
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To begin with, socialist law is underpinned by distinctive 
jurisprudential foundation. A legal system is characterized not only by 
rules, methods, institutions, and procedures, but more essentially by 
jurisprudential foundation or fundamental ideas and principles that 
underpin the legal system. In this regard, socialist law is undergirded 
by distinctive fundamental legal ideas and principles, which 
differentiates it from other legal systems, and hence makes it a 
distinctive legal system. The ideational foundation of socialist law is 
rooted in Marxism-Leninism, defined by these distinctive legal 
concepts: “socialist legality”; “vanguardism”; “democratic 
centralism”; “public ownership of means of productions”, and statist 
rights. These concepts are hegemonic in the socialist legal system, 
dominating the law-making and legal discourse and practices of 
politicians, legislators, lawyers, officers, and ordinary citizens. Other 
legal systems do not have such concepts or vocabularies. These 
concepts are embodied in the socialist legal system and guild the 
direction of legal evolution and of the society as a whole towards what 
the communists believe as the paradise of socialism and then 
communism. Therefore, the Law on Legislation in China requires that: 
“Lawmaking shall adhere to the basic principles of the Constitution, 
and shall be centered around economic development, and shall adhere 
to the socialist road, adhere to the democratic dictatorship by the 
people, adhere to the leadership by the Chinese Communist Party, and 
adhere to the theory of Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong thoughts 
and Dengxiaoping theory, and adhere to the reform and opening to the 
outside world.”244 
Socialist law may contain some rules and procedures similar to 
those of civil law, but they are fundamentally sustained by different 
legal principles, which make the operation, manifestation, and nuance 
of the similar rules and procedures different. For example, the concept 
of public ownership may be adopted in other legal systems, but in the 
socialist legal system, this concept dominates the whole economy and 
the whole property regime with the regime’s aspiration to achieve the 
socialist paradise in which every property belong to the public. 
Moreover, the domination of the communist party also means that its 
ideology (Marxism-Leninism) dominates the whole intellectual life of 
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the society despite the emergence of pluralist ideas due to social 
complexity and globalization. 
Partlett and Ip correctly point out that socialist law is evident in 
Chinese public law. This is evident in Vietnam as well. However, the 
influence of socialist law in China and Vietnam is not confined to 
public law. Even private law is also influenced by the socialist legal 
concepts and principles. Law for the market, such as corporate law, 
competition law, investment law, and property law, cannot escape the 
“socialist orientation” of the market economy. The so-called 
“economic law” in China which has it root in Soviet law is an 
instrument for the state to direct the economy towards the state’s 
socialist goal. The Chinese government defines the function of 
economic law as follow: “Economic laws are a collection of laws and 
regulations which adjust social and economic relations arising from the 
state’s intervening in, managing and regulating economic activities for 
the society’s overall interests. They provide legal devices and an 
institutional framework for the state to conduct appropriate 
intervention in, and macro control of the market economy, thereby 
preventing malpractices resulting from spontaneous and blind 
operation of the market economy.”245 Vietnam also has the “economic 
law,” which has the same instrumental function, although it has 
gradually changed to be more like business law.246 In fact, the whole 
legal system in China and Vietnam are underlined by the fundamental 
socialist legal concepts and principles. Some aspects of the legal system 
in China and Vietnam may contain some non-socialist elements, but 
fundamental socialist legal concepts and principles, such as “socialist 
legality”, the leadership of the communist party; “democratic 
centralism”, remains dominant in the legal system. Finally, socialist 
law and socialist legal theory have still provided distinctive legal 
vocabularies and concepts for legal discourse in China and Vietnam.247 
Let us now turn to consider the second element in the socialist 
legal system: the structure. The most important element in the socialist 
legal structure is the communist party, which differentiates the socialist 
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legal system from other modern legal systems. To be sure, absolute 
power or single-party system is not distinctive to socialist law. But, in 
the socialist legal system, the communist party is not a private 
organization separate from the state created to compete for power 
through free and equal elections: it is essential component of the legal 
structure and dominates all aspects of the state and the society with 
party departments created from the central to the communal levels.248 
Socialist law in China and Vietnam cannot be conceptualized without 
the consideration of the essential role of the communist party in the 
legal system. 
The state institutions in China and Vietnam also have distinctive 
features. To be sure, like many other countries, these countries also 
have three fundamental state powers, legislature, executive, and 
judiciary, practiced by different state branches. However, the 
arrangement of these institutions is different due to the fact that they 
are underlined by different constitutional jurisprudences. This 
arrangement is characterized by the supreme position of the legislature 
and the subordinate positions of other institutions. This formal 
arrangement is underpinned by the principle of “democratic 
centralism.” Within that arrangement, the legislature is not merely an 
ordinary legislature as in western civil or common law countries. It is 
both the constitution-making and law-making bodies. It has both 
constituent power and constituted powers. In terms of constituted 
powers, it has not only the legislative power, but also other powers that 
may be practiced by other institutions in civil law and common law 
countries, such as the power to review the constitutionality of the law 
(including its law and regulations issued by other state institutions). 
Other state institutions are constitutionally required to report to the 
legislature and have no institutional means to challenge it, such as veto, 
dissolution, or judicial review. This arrangement must be distinguished 
with the commonwealth model of parliamentary supremacy 
underpinned by a different concept of sovereignty in which the 
                                                                                                                         
248. Backer Larry Catá, Party, People, Government, And State: On Constitutional Values 
And The Legitimacy of The Chinese State-Party Rule of Law System, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 331, 
342 2012 (“the party as the polity”). For the case of Vietnam, see Tuong Vu, The Revolutionary 
Path to State Formation in Vietnam: Opportunities, Conundrums, and Legacies, 11 J. VIET. 
STUD. 267 (2016) (arguing that “the [communist] party’s radical ideology and practices shaped 
the path of state formation by creating particular opportunities and conundrums in five key 
aspects of state formation: legitimization, establishing sovereignty, territorialization, creating a 
centralized bureaucracy, and monopolizing violence.”). 
2017] THE LAW OF CHINA AND VIETNAM 193 
executive can dissolve the parliament and the courts can have the weak 
judicial review power.249 
In addition, the courts system in the socialist legal structure in 
China and Vietnam has the distinctive feature: centralization. In 
socialist law, “following the Leninist principles of vanguardism and 
democratic centralism, courts were seen as extensions of Party control. 
Thus, all courts were institutionally subordinated to a powerful 
Supreme Court with vast power to control the work of lower courts and 
‘articulate judicial policy.’”250 Partlett and Ip indicate that this feature 
“has not faded away” in China. 251 More specifically, “like Soviet 
courts, Chinese courts were centralized supervisory institutions 
entrusted with the responsibility to promote the Party’s ideology and 
agenda.”252 Courts in Vietnam have similar feature. The Law on 
Organization of People’s Courts of 2014 is enacted, among other 
things, “to institutionalize the Party’s guidelines and viewpoints on 
judicial reform.”253 The Law establishes one of the chief functions of 
the courts as to protect “the socialist regime.”254 The Law also creates 
a centralized judicial system. Accordingly, the supreme people’s court 
is vested with the powers: (1) to supervise the adjudicating work of 
other courts, except cases prescribed by a law; (2) To make overall 
assessment of adjudicating practices of courts, ensuring the uniform 
application of law in trial; (3) to train and retrain judges, assessors and 
other staffs of people’s courts; (4) to manage people’s courts and 
military courts organizationally in accordance with this Law and 
relevant laws, ensuring independence of courts from one another; and 
(5) to submit to the National Assembly draft laws and resolutions; to 
submit to the National Assembly Standing Committee draft ordinances 
and resolutions in accordance with law.255 
The structure of the socialist legal system in China and Vietnam 
is also characterized by the Leninist-style institution called procuracy. 
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Lenin designed this institution to implement the principle of “socialist 
legality”: strict and unanimous application of the law of the central 
government by the lower level state institutions and citizens. 256 In the 
legal structure in China and Vietnam, the procuracy remains the fourth 
branch of the state, not a component of the executive or the judiciary, 
organized from the central to the local levels.257 However, their 
functions are narrower than in the original version: they practice public 
prosecution, and only supervise judicial procedures and activities.258 
While the former function is similar to the prosecutions in other legal 
systems, the later function is distinctive to the socialist legal system, 
reflecting the Leninist legacy. 
We are now in a position to consider the substance of socialist 
law. To be sure, the sources of legal rules and norms in China and 
Vietnam include codes and legislations like in many civil law countries. 
The two countries have also begun to develop case-law like common 
law countries. But, one of most important features of the legal rules in 
the socialist legal systems in China and Vietnam is their sources 
contained in a huge amount of administrative regulations issued by 
different institutions and with different titles. In China, in addition to 
the constitution, the sources of Chinese law, as stipulated in the 
Legislation Law, include: “the law (Falu) enacted by the NPC; 
administrative regulations (Tiaoli, Guiding or Banfa) enacted by the 
State Council (central government); administrative rules (Guizhang) 
enacted by the State Council organs; local regulation enacted by the 
local People’s Congress (Di Fang Tiaoli); and local rules (Guizhang) 
enacted by local governments.”259 
In a similar vein, the Law on Enactment of Normative Legal 
Documents lists the following sources of Vietnamese law: 
1. The Constitution. 
                                                                                                                         
256.  See generally, Stephen Holmes, The Procuracy and Its Problems: Introduction, 8 E. 
EUR. CONST. REV. 76 (1999). 
257. For the case of China, see Partlett & Ip, supra note 102, at 498-501. For the case of 
Vietnam, see Pham Lan Phuong, The Procuracy as a Subject of Constitutional Debate: 
Controversial and Unresolved Issues, 11 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 309 (2016). 
258. For more details, see Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorates of the People’s 
Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cont., Sept. 2, 1983), 
art. 4; Law on Organization of the People’s Procuracies, art. 2 (Nov. 24, 2014) (Viet.). 
259. Qianlan Wu, How has China Formed Its Conception of The Rule of Law? A 
Contextual Analysis of Legal Instrumentalism in ROC And PRC Law-Making, INT’L J. L. IN 
CONTEXT 5 (2017). 
2017] THE LAW OF CHINA AND VIETNAM 195 
2. Codes and Laws (hereinafter referred to as Laws), Resolutions 
of the National Assembly 
3. Ordinances, Resolutions of Standing Committee of the National 
Assembly; Joint Resolutions between Standing Committee of the 
National Assembly and Management Board of Central Committee 
of Vietnamese Fatherland Front 
4. Orders, Decisions of the President. 
5. Decrees of the Government; Joint Resolutions between the 
Government and Management Board of Central Committee of 
Vietnamese Fatherland Front 
6. Decision of the Prime Minister. 
7. Resolutions of Judge Council of the People’s Supreme Court. 
8. Circulars of executive judge of the People’s Supreme Court; 
Circulars of the Chief Procurator of the Supreme People’s 
Procuracy; Circulars of Ministers, Heads of ministerial agencies; 
Joint Circulars between executive judge of the People’s Supreme 
Court and the Chief Procurator of the Supreme People’s 
Procuracy; Joint Circulars between Ministers, Heads of ministerial 
agencies and executive judge of the People’s Supreme Court, the 
Chief Procurator of the 
9. Supreme People’s Procuracy; Decisions of State Auditor 
General. 
10. Resolutions of the People’s Councils of central affiliated cities 
and provinces (hereinafter referred to as provinces). 
11. Decisions of the People’s Committees of provinces. 
12. Legislative documents of local governments in administrative 
economic units. 
13. Resolutions of the People’s Councils of districts, towns and 
cities within provinces (hereinafter referred to as districts). 
14. Decisions of the People’s Committees of districts. 
15. Resolutions of the People’s Councils of communes, wards and 
towns within districts (hereinafter referred to as communes) 
16. Decisions of the People’s Committees of communes.260 
This feature of legal source is due both to the practical need to 
govern the emerging market and changing society and to the 
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jurisprudential reason concerning Marxist legal positivism. These legal 
instruments play an important role in the socialist legal system in 
Vietnam: these regulations are essential to the implementation of the 
constitutions, codes, and legislations. The latter do not have the direct 
effect to the society like the former. So, different from civil and 
common law systems, in the socialist legal system, the constitution and 
legislations are enforced mainly not by court’s judicial decisions but by 
administrative regulations. 
Another feature of socialist legal rules and norms is that they can 
be found even in the documents of the communist party. As the 
communist party is the essential component of the legal structure, its 
documents are not purely political but also include norms or even rules 
that have the weight of legal effects. The communist party in China and 
Vietnam, through national congresses, the central committee, and the 
Politburo, often issue documents which decide on consequential 
national issues, and provide the guidance for socioeconomic, legal and 
political developments. The party conclusions and guidance are not 
optional but authoritative to the state actions. The state bodies cannot 
in general reverse what has been decided by the party. For example, the 
opening policy for economic reform in both China and Vietnam was 
decided by the communist party and then was translated into 
constitutions and law.261 With this definitive effect, the party’s 
documents can be considered having legal weight in certain 
circumstances. In this regard, the Communist Party of China’s Central 
Committee’s Decision Concerning Some Major Questions in 
Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country According to the Law 
is the authoritative legal source. The Communist Party of Vietnam’s 
Politburo’s Conclusion No.01-Kl/Tw on The Continued 
Implementation of The Strategy for Legal Reform from 2016 to 2020 
has similar legal significance. 
The contents of legal rules in socialist law include issues similar 
to the law of common law and civil law countries. But, socialist law 
does not adopt the distinction between “public law” and “private law” 
as in other legal systems. Instead, legal rules and norms in socialist law 
are grouped under the rubric called “branch of law.” In the Soviet legal 
jurisprudence, “a ‘branch of law’ is understood as the aggregate of legal 
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norms regulating relations in a particular sphere (branch) of social 
life”.262 The concept of “branch of law” has still informed the socialist 
legal system in China and Vietnam. For example, in China’s 
Whitepaper on its legal system refers to “branches of the socialist 
system of laws with Chinese characteristics”.263 Accordingly, “the 
socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics is an organic 
integration of the related laws of the Constitution, civil and commercial 
laws, administrative laws, economic laws, social laws, criminal laws, 
litigation and non-litigation procedural laws, and other legal branches, 
with the Constitution in the supreme place, the laws as the main body, 
and administrative and local regulations as the major components.”264 
Similarly, the concept of “branch of law” remains dominant in 
Vietnam. In law-making, a legislation is normally started by 
identifying the particular sphere of social life that the legislation will 
regulate.265 The division of the “branch of law” also affects legal 
education. Vietnamese textbooks on “general theory on law and state” 
clearly define the concept of “branch of law,” its components 
(including “scope of regulation” and “method of regulation”), and 
introduce fundamental branches of law in the Vietnamese legal system, 
including: state law or constitutional law, administrative law, financial 
law, land law, civil law, labor law, marriage and family law, criminal 
law, criminal procedure law, civil procedure law, economic law, and 
international law).266 Even the structure of law schools in Vietnam is 
also organized according to the concept of “branch of law” following 
the soviet-style. Therefore, the law schools are divided into certain 
“departments” consistent with the branches of law.267 
Finally, let us consider legal culture. Unlike rules and structures, 
legal culture need time to establish. There may not be a well-
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established socialist legal culture in China and Vietnam. However, 
some features of legal culture of socialist law have germinated in China 
and Vietnam. At least, two emerging cultures can be observed, which 
can be called: the regulatory culture and the bureaucratic culture. First, 
the regulatory culture indicates a strong tendency among the state 
agencies to regulate the society as a top-down, interventional process. 
To be sure, regulation is not distinctive to the socialist legal system.268 
However, socialist law, as evident in China and Vietnam, has a heavy 
concern on the state’s regulatory intervention on nearly all corners of 
the society, ranging from the way to organize the public power to the 
way to wear clothes.269 Among other purposes (eg., economic 
development), this socialist regulation is meant to direct people’s 
behaviors towards the culture and goals that the state favor. The second 
culture is bureaucratic. In this regard, legal and administrative process 
in socialist law heavily requires multi-steps of procedures. This is not 
merely a technical issue. The heavy concern of multi-staged procedures 
is to make sure that the party and the state can meticulously control the 
society and people’s behavior to achieve their goals. 
IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A BETTER PLACE IN 
COMPARATIVE LAW 
I conclude with further reflections on possible contributions of the 
study of law in China and Vietnam to traditional comparative law, post-
modern comparative law, and global comparative law.270 
To begin with, the study of the law of China and Vietnam can 
enrich traditional comparative law. As Siems writes, “the disregard of 
non-western countries by traditional comparative law is more difficult 
to excuse.”271 The study of law in China and Vietnam can avoid such 
excuse. Moreover, the diversity of law in the legal history of China and 
Vietnam cast doubt on the functionalist approach in traditional 
comparative law which tends to overemphasis the common legal 
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features.272 In addition, the study of law in China and Vietnam can 
rectify some mistakes in classification of legal systems in traditional 
comparative law. It is simplistic to group law in China under a single 
rubric, like “Chinese Law”273 or “Chinese legal tradition.”274 There are 
different legal systems in China and Vietnam, and these legal systems 
play the dominant role in different period of time. The traditional 
taxonomy of legal systems can be enriched by the addition of two 
distinctive legal systems, namely the Confucian legal system and the 
socialist legal system. Moreover, the study of these legal systems is 
important for understanding legal history and contemporary law not 
only in China and Vietnam but also in other countries and jurisdictions 
whose traditional law and modern law are influenced by these legal 
systems. To illustrate, Confucian law also influenced legal history and 
even modern law in Japan and Korea.275 Vestiges of Confucian legal 
culture can also be found in Singapore276 and Hong Kong.277 Socialist 
law is also adopted and has recently experienced different levels of 
change in three other contemporary socialist countries, namely Laos,278 
North Korea,279 and Cuba.280 Finally, the addition of the Confucian 
legal system and the socialist legal system can enrich comparative legal 
systems. Confucian law can be compared with other traditional legal 
systems (e.g., Islamic law, Hindu law, and Buddhist law),281 while 
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socialist law can be compared with other modern legal systems (e.g., 
civil law and common law). 
The study of law in China and Vietnam can also contribute to 
post-modern comparative law, which focuses on the way similar legal 
words and concepts having different meaning in different legal 
systems.282 Throughout its history, law in China and Vietnam is 
apparently not autonomous. Their law is not merely controlled by 
professional lawyers but is understood and practiced in its complex 
relationship with contextual factors. Therefore, China and Vietnam 
provide rich data for post-modernist comparative studies of: law and 
ideology, law and politics, law and culture, law and society, and legal 
pluralism. 
Finally, global comparative law can greatly benefit from 
exploring law in China and Vietnam. These countries provide rich data 
for the study of legal transplants and global legal diffusion. Confucian 
law was transplanted cross East Asian traditional societies, and this 
deserves a comparative study. The transplants of civil law and socialist 
law in China and Vietnam further provide a laboratory for comparative 
examination of legal transplants. Moreover, the fact that China and 
Vietnam are now global actors and vehemently borrowed global law 
provide significant data for study of legal global diffusion. Last but not 
least, the global revival of the “law and development” movement283 is 
resonated in the two countries.284 While some are optimistic about the 
role of law in fostering economic development, others are frustrated 
about reality.285 Economic development in China and Vietnam in the 
last three decades has occurred in tandem with legal reform. Whether 
there is connection between the legal reform and the economic reform 
deserves further comparative legal studies. 
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